Pakistan, un paese in crisi

Ragionpolitica, 25 ottobre

 

Mentre Obama, novello Amleto, si cincischia a Washington su cosa fare in Afghanistan e in Pakistan, e sulle questioni più spinose sullo scenario internazionale, indeciso su tutto, a metà strada tra politiche opportunistiche e promesse elettorali di pace universale, la situazione in quell'area, che in gergo si chiama Afpak in un acronimo che rende idea dell' indissolubilità delle due crisi, si fa sempre più pesante.

Il punto è che l'intervento internazionale, americano e Nato,iniziato in Afghanistan per dare la caccia ad Al Qaida si è trasformato nel corso degli anni in qualche cosa di ben diverso e i cambiamenti sono avvenuti su tutti e due i lati del conflitto, sia su quello del nemico che nel campo degli alleati. Incominciando da quest'ultimo, la guerra afgana ha smesso di essere un problema internazionale perché sul campo la NATO ha dimostrato tutta la sua impotenza e incapacità di intervento. I governi occidentali in realtà non si sentono parte in causa, ognuno ha interpretato a modo suo la richiesta d'aiuto dell'alleato sia per quantità di forze da impiegare che per regole di ingaggio finendo a rinchiudere a chiave i propri soldati entro fortini con la speranza di ridurre al minimo il numero delle perdite. Doppio fallimento quindi, politico e militare che nei rapporti tra Stati Uniti e alleati europei conterà parecchio nel prossimo futuro.

Sul piano geopolitico, la guerra ha prodotto cambiamenti enormi nell'area. In primo luogo, la guerra afghana si è trasformata in una questione interna, in una lotta anche tra etnie in una nazione ormai allo sbando dopo quasi 30 anni di distruzioni e morti. Il risultato è che i talebani hanno portato il conflitto anche nelle zone pashtun del nord Pakistan, in quelle province tribali amministrate con ampie autonomia ma anche tenute ben distanti dall'intervento economico e sociale dello stato pakistano. Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) o "cintura tribale del Pakistan", sono i nomi mitici che rimandano ad un inesistente confine tra i due paesi inventato per comodità imperiale dagli inglesi nel 1893, la "Durand line", con conseguenze nefaste, perché ripartiva un etnia tra due paesi con due ruoli ben diversi, dominante in Afghanistan e minoranza in Pakistan. Questo per lo meno fino all'avvento di Karzai che escludeva per la prima volta nella storia i pashtun dal governo di Kabul a vantaggio dell'Alleanza del Nord a maggioranza tagika, azara e uzbeca.

Per capire quello che sta succedendo è necessario riportare il ruolo dei talebani nello scacchiere asiatico. Il primo fatto, risaputo, è che il Pakistan ha sempre appoggiato i talebani con una triplice funzione: creare in Afghanistan un regime amico che si opponesse alle rivendicazioni indiane e che formasse una cintura di sicurezza, assieme all'Arabia Saudita, contro le mire espansionistiche e rivoluzionarie dello scita Iran. Mai insomma il governo di Karachi ha visto i fondamentalisti afghani come una minaccia. Ma il Pakistan vive anche grazie all'aiuto americano e le cose non potevano non cambiare dopo l'11 settembre, costringendo il governo ad assumere posizioni più dure. Il fatto è che l'asse centrale dello stato pakistano è rappresentato dal complesso militare con al centro i suoi servizi segreti –l'ISI -, e in questo settore statale invece non c'è stato quel cambio netto di marcia, perché la visione strategica è rimasta la stessa di prima dell'attentato alle Twin Towers. L'India è sempre percepita come il primo nemico. Nel frattempo però, in un gioco di specchi difficile da controllare, il movimento talebano si radicalizzava anche tra i pashtun pakistani che coglievano l'occasione della presenza delle truppe americane in Afghanistan anche per combattere il governo pakistano visto come filo occidentale, nemico del loro popolo e infedele! Come si capisce spinte etnico-nazionaliste, questioni di potere e motivi religiosi si fondono trasformando la questione in un groviglio inestricabile.

Stretto comunque dalla necessità di fare qualcosa, con i talebani pakistani sempre più invadenti, gli americani che minacciano sempre di chiudere i cordoni della borsa, l'esercito pakistano a più riprese ha condotto azioni contro i talebani nell'area tribale. Le ha condotte però male, con scarso impegno e in modo tradizionale. Innanzi tutto, esse non rientrano in una strategia di lunga durata, ma sono campagne isolate e scollegate l'una dall'altra alternando la politica del bastone e della carota, forza e trattativa, in modo sconclusionato (si ricorderà infatti il riconoscimento della legge islamica in deroga al diritto pakistano per quest'area); in secondo luogo sono condotte con una logica non di anti insorgenza ma secondo i principi classici della guerra tradizionale e quindi, in terzo luogo, non hanno al centro la sicurezza della popolazione locale. Il risultato è devastante: un milione e mezzo di profughi per cui non è stato prevista nessuna politica di accoglienza, terreno fertile per ogni propaganda estremista e di reclutamento talebano.

"Afpak "a questo punto non è più un acronimo giornalistico: è una realtà unitaria resa ancor più complessa da altre due fatti come la presenza di cinquanta testate nucleari puntate contro l'unica democrazia dell'area, quell'India che sta facendo passi da gigante nel processo d'integrazione mondiale.

La guerra si sta rilevando come il più impietoso banco della verità di ogni velleità e retorica multilateralista tanto sbandierata in campagna elettorale. A Obama non rimane altro che decidere e agli europei, ancora una volta, non rimane altro che aspettare le decisioni dell'amico americano. E l'Alleanza Atlantica? Il fallimento del ruolo della Nato post guerra fredda come forza di proiezione è evidente e niente dopo questa guerra sarà come prima.

L’icona Obama

Lì

L'occidentale 27 ottobre

E' un icona, un rimando ad una altra realtà, anzi ad altre; simbolo di tutto ciò che i cittadini spettatori vorrebbero di bene al mondo senza pagare nessun prezzo alla durezza della vita e delle sue leggi. E questo è possibile perché la dimensione del politico si articola per lo meno su tre livelli. Innanzitutto vi è la visione, il progetto complessivo, lo sguardo illuminato sull'andamento della storia e qui che si vede se un capo è un leader, il predestinato che sa capire la direzione, i passaggi fondamentali e indicare la strada al suo popolo. In secondo luogo, vi sono le scelte quotidiane, la routine, che vanno gestite con pragmatismo e buon senso senza mai di dimenticarsi di coordinarle con il piano superiore. Da ultimo, c'è la retorica, la gestione del consenso, l'olio che permette l'amalgama di tutti gli elementi. Ecco Obama ha innalzato quest'ultimo elemento a architrave portante di tutto l'edificio della sua politica e questo è vero specialmente per la politica estera americana. In questa sfera d'azione, dove le percezioni equivalgono a fatti, la prima opera è stato cambiare il segno alle parole d'ordine che hanno segnato i due mandati di Bush, sostituire il prefisso "multi" all' "uni" in nome di una maggiore moralità, e il gioco è fatto. Multilateralismo al posto di unilateralismo, multipolarismo invece di unipolarismo, guerre di necessità contro guerre di scelta, politica dell'ascolto e non più arroganza, e così via.

Ma le cose non sono così semplici e lo schema non funziona. Prendiamo per esempio la questione della presunta maggiore universalità della politica obamiama; se fosse così i diritti umani sarebbero al primo posto, la promozione e la salvaguardia di un bene primario, di uno standard minimo di dignità, dovrebbe essere in testa all'agenda di una politica volta verso il rispetto della persona e non più in mano alla gang dei cinici petrolieri texani. E, invece, no. Il primo presidente di colore che dovrebbe essere guidato dallo spirito idelista wilsoniano rifiuta di incontrarsi con il Dalai Lama per non offendere gli amici cinesi. Mai il guerrafondaio Bush si sarebbe permesso un diniego così esplosivo!

E' il caso più eclatante che ben mostra però il limite strutturale dell'azione di Obama. Si potrebbe continuare a lungo, dalle posizioni sullo scudo spaziale europeo al modo di gestione del processo di pace israelo palestinese, al negoziato con l'Iran, alle indecisioni afghane. Una retorica umanitaria buonista multilaterale a coprire un realismo opportunista determinato a sua volta dalla vera essenza della sua politica estera, l'accettazione dello status quo, la globalizzazione come bene comunque essa sia. Ecco il principio ultimo!

Mentre Bush è stato costretto dagli eventi ad un interventismo revisionista dell'ordine mondiale a partire dal Medio Oriente, mentre Bush dopo l'11 settembre ha provato a ridisegnare gli equilibri globali dall'Iraq ai rapporti con gli alleati e con la Russia, Obama vuol tornare ad una situazione più tranquilla che permetta all'America di fare dei buoni affari con tutti, dalla Cina al resto del mondo, stando ben dentro il processo di integrazione mondiale e avendo ben poche pretese di dirigerlo. Il suo sogno è di disfarsi delle conflittualità armate per concentrarsi sulle relazioni economiche, in primo luogo con Cina e l'Asia. A spingerlo in questa direzione vi sono per lo meno due verità impossibili da smentire, la crisi economica e le difficoltà della guerra, ma questo non basta a spiegare questo nuovo indirizzo.

La verità è che, come sempre, le parole mielate, la retorica buonista serve a mascherare decisioni in direzioni opposte, dettate dal più duro realismo economicista o, direbbe Tremonti, mercatista. Ecco che allora diritti umani e alleati possono bene essere scambiati in nome della stabilità: la Cina prima del Tibet, la Russia prima dei paesi dell'Est Europa, l'Iran prima di Israele.

LA GUERRA RIVOLUZIONARIA

SECOLO, 24 OTTOBRE

Sono passati pochi giorni da quando le note del silenzio fuori ordinanza hanno accompagnato i feretri dei nostri soldati nella Basilica di San Paolo fuori le mura. Noi italiani non siamo abituati a parlare di guerra. Il dramma di essere stati tra glia aggressori nel 1940, del disfacimento dello stato con l'8 settembre, di cinquant'anni passati sotto la protezione dell'aquila americana, a cui si devono aggiungere i luoghi comuni del politicamente corretto catto comunista, ci hanno fatto dimenticare l'esistenza della guerra nel mondo, della sua necessità. Verità che si riflette anche nella nostra Costituzione, in quell'articolo 11 più volte chiamato in causa. Se queste sono le condizioni culturali del paese – fino a trasformarsi in tratti antropologici -, non stupisce il modo in cui i nostri governi, specialmente quelli di centro sinistra, hanno condotto il paese nei vari teatri mondiali a partire da quell'operazione in Libano nel lontano 1982. "Peace keeping", "peace enforcing", "state buiding", insomma tutte azioni di pace in cui i soldati italiani svolgono il ruolo di missionari, infermieri e geometri, al massimo un po' armati, ma solo per difesa personale! Questa è la vulgata che si racconta.

E i risultati di questo atteggiamento nazionale verso la guerra si vedono. Dopo la strage di Kabul, c'è qualcosa di bello e commovente nello stringersi del paese attorno alle famiglie di quelle sei famiglie, ma allo stesso tempo fanno impressione i giudizi sulla guerra. Se non sembrasse bolso patriottismo, cinismo, o, peggio ancora, disprezzo per i caduti, il sorgere di una discussione sull'andamento della campagna afgana dopo la strage di Kabul è francamente un po' incredibile.

Ecco il vero obiettivo dei talebani, di Al Qaida e di ogni tipo di terrorismo internazionale che agisca per motivi rivoluzionari e religiosi. Non vogliono vincere sul piano militare perché non possono, non ne hanno la forza e le capacità: che cosa può un Khalashinikov contro un carro armato? Sul piatto, dalla loro possono solo fare affidamento su due armi: motivazione e pazienza.

L'aveva ben capito Mao Tse Tung all'epoca della Lunga Marcia. Il grande timoniere aveva davanti a sé l'esempio drammatico della sconfitta etiope da parte italiana, in una guerra fatta di scontri frontali e segnata dalla brutalità fuorilegge degli occupanti che non si peritarono ad utilizzare il gas. La soluzione geniale di Mao fu semplice e va sotto l'etichetta di "guerra rivoluzionaria". Per la prima volta, la strategia di Fabio Massimo "il temporeggiatore", la guerriglia usata dagli spagnoli contro le truppe di Napoleone, le tecniche partigiane della Seconda guerra mondiale contro i tedeschi si andavano ad assommare ad una teoria politica, alla variante cinese del comunismo, producendo una teoria rivoluzionaria della guerra di popolo che stravolgeva tutti i dettami degli staretghi della terza internazionale. Fino allora infatti, sull'esempio della Rivoluzione d'Ottobre, il marxismo leninismo aveva teorizzato una versione popolare del colpo di stato, cioè aveva offerto una teoria dell'insurrezione in armi, della spallata definitiva.

La mobilitazione politica delle masse, nel pensiero maoista, può sostituire quella industriale: la popolazione è l'acqua dove nuotano i pesci. Per Mao, come in Sun Tzu, il problema è quello di evitare lo scontro, di riuscire a vincere senza combattere. Il problema militare è come organizzare lo spazio per guadagnare tempo e il problema politico è rappresentato dall'utilizzo del tempo guadagnato per organizzare il popolo e prima di tutto la sua avanguardia cosciente, il partito; tempo per ottenere volontà-determinazione rivoluzionaria da inquadrare. Il mezzo della guerra rivoluzionaria è "la guerra protratta". La guerra di potenza deve essere ridotta e trasformata in guerra di frizione e psicologica. Mao prende tempo per raggiungere il duplice scopo di agitare, sobillare la popolazione e allo stesso tempo sfinire il nemico in estenuanti azioni. Così mentre il più forte nemico si logora nella caccia ai fantasmi e porta a spasso per l'enorme paese i suoi cannoni, l'esercito rivoluzionario crea nelle zone liberate un contro governo, delle istituzioni funzionanti e alternative al governo centrale. Gli insorti non hanno l'obiettivo centrale di sconfiggere il nemico – come potrebbero? I loro scopo è solo uno, conquistare alla propria causa con le buone e con le cattive, le masse. Si sa come andò a finire, che fine fece il Kuomintang.

Certo oggi sono passati più di settanta anni, le cose sono in parte cambiate; solo la Cina può contare su di un'estensione che permette uno scambio razionale tra spazio e tempo. Ma in mezzo si sono aggiunte decine di altre esperienze di guerre asimmetriche. Per esempio, la guerra d'Indocina, la rivoluzione cubana, la guerra di Algeria, il Vietnam, solo per nominare quelle che hanno visto la vittoria di movimenti rivoluzionari. In primo luogo, si è aggiunta l'asimmetria e disparità di interessi in gioco. Se nel caso di Chan Kai Shek e Mao si trattava di una guerra civile, entrambi però condividevano lo stesso fine, combattevano per andare al potere nel proprio paese; nelle guerre successive alla seconda guerra mondiale, invece, ci troviamo davanti a contendenti che hanno interessi in gioco completamente diversi. Mentre il combattente più debole è locale, l'esercito più forte arriva da lontano, da una potenza oltremare. Mentre il primo lotta per la vita e la morte, il secondo combatte una guerra parziale. Guerra totale contro guerra limitata, interessi vitali contro interessi mediati. Ecco che interessi diversi in gioco stabiliscono una diverso atteggiamento nei confronti del tempo: pazienza contro fretta, fretta di tornare a casa, fretta di spendere troppi soldi, fretta di perdere troppi uomini. Il fattore tempo si rivela l'elemento centrale: non più spazio per acquisire il tempo, ma aumento della frizione con l'utilizzo di tutti i metodi per estenuare il nemico sia sul campo che a casa. Ai rivoluzionari, per vincere la guerra, basta non perderla.

Come il centro di gravità dei rivoluzionari è rappresentato dalla conquista dei cuori e le menti del proprio popolo, adesso nell'era dei mass media, del villaggio globale, il centro di gravità della potenza occidentale è costituito dalla propria opinione pubblica. E questa è la grande scoperta sia del FLN algerino che dei vietnamiti. La guerra diventa una gigantesca operazione di propaganda, di pubbliche relazioni, di uso intelligente dei media, di uso della diplomazia. Ogni mezzo è buono per isolare il nemico, attraverso una strategia a cerchi concentrici, e fiaccarne così la volontà. I vietnamiti e gli algerini furono maestri a far passare la loro lotta come lotta di tutti gli oppressi del mondo; a dipingere il nemico come un assassino barbaro (spesso purtroppo a ragione) e cosa ben più grave a far dimenticare le loro barbarie. Niente trapelava delle stragi di civili e avversari politici da parte del FLN, niente dei montagnard.

Il risultato è semplice, la gestione del fronte interno si rivela altrettanto importante del campo di battaglia. Ai potenti eserciti occidentali, per vincere la guerra, non è sufficiente vincere il conflitto armato. I governi devono combattere una battaglia ben più insidiosa contro la distrazione, la stanchezza, la demotivazione tra le proprie file. E' così che l'offensiva del Tet, in cui le truppe vietcong andarono incontro ad una disfatta rovinosa, si trasforma in una vittoria; è così che la battaglia di Algeri diventain una sconfitta per i francesi.

Globalizzazione e tecnica, internet con la sua funzione di moltiplicatore esponenziale adesso si sono andati ad aggiungere al fanatismo religioso. Un semplice atto di un terrorista suicida fa più danno di una battaglia campale. Con mille euro si raggiunge lo scopo che centinaia di migliaia degli stessi euro mai raggiungerebbero. Un solo kamikaze è più efficace di 100 uomini ben addestrati.

Ha ragione il generale McCrystal, il comandante in capo delle truppe occidentali in Afghanistan. Stiamo perdendo la guerra, perché abbiamo perso sul campo l'iniziativa e l'offensiva mediatica. E da qui bisogna ricominciare. Non ci sono scorciatoie, per questo è importante dire la verità all'opinione pubblica, preparala alla durezza della guerra, considerare il conflitto armato come un male necessario. Solo vincendo la battaglia per la conquista dei "cuori e le menti" della nostra opinione pubblica vinceremo la lotta contro i Talebani e Al Qaida. Dobbiamo parlare di guerra non solo quando i nostri muoiono, ma anche e soprattutto quando vincono. Altrimenti, che ci stanno a fare in Afghanistan e perché dobbiamo combattere, quando abbiamo paura a nominare la parola "guerra"?

APPUNTI INTERNAZIONALI 18

L'OCCIDENTALE, 24 OTTOBRE

Mentre Obama, novello Amleto, si cincischia a Washington su cosa fare in Afghanistan e in Pakistan, e sulle questioni più spinose sullo scenario internazionale, indeciso su tutto, a metà strada tra politiche opportunistiche e promesse elettorali di pace universale, la situazione in quell'area, che in gergo si chiama Afpak in un acronimo che rende idea dell' indissolubilità delle due crisi, si fa sempre più pesante.

Il punto è che l'intervento internazionale, americano e Nato,iniziato in Afghanistan per dare la caccia ad Al Qaida si è trasformato nel corso degli anni in qualche cosa di ben diverso e i cambiamenti sono avvenuti su tutti e due i lati del conflitto, sia su quello del nemico che nel campo degli alleati. Incominciando da quest'ultimo, la guerra afgana ha smesso di essere un problema internazionale perché sul campo la NATO ha dimostrato tutta la sua impotenza e incapacità di intervento. I governi occidentali in realtà non si sentono parte in causa, ognuno ha interpretato a modo suo la richiesta d'aiuto dell'alleato sia per quantità di forze da impiegare che per regole di ingaggio finendo a rinchiudere a chiave i propri soldati entro fortini con la speranza di ridurre al minimo il numero delle perdite. Doppio fallimento quindi, politico e militare che nei rapporti tra Stati Uniti e alleati europei conterà parecchio nel prossimo futuro.

Sul piano geopolitico, la guerra ha prodotto cambiamenti enormi nell'area. In primo luogo, la guerra afghana si è trasformata in una questione interna, in una lotta anche tra etnie in una nazione ormai allo sbando dopo quasi 30 anni di distruzioni e morti. Il risultato è che i talebani hanno portato il conflitto anche nelle zone pashtun del nord Pakistan, in quelle province tribali amministrate con ampie autonomia ma anche tenute ben distanti dall'intervento economico e sociale dello stato pakistano. Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) o "cintura tribale del Pakistan", sono i nomi mitici che rimandano ad un inesistente confine tra i due paesi inventato per comodità imperiale dagli inglesi nel 1893, la "Durand line", con conseguenze nefaste, perché ripartiva un etnia tra due paesi con due ruoli ben diversi, dominante in Afghanistan e minoranza in Pakistan. Questo per lo meno fino all'avvento di Karzai che escludeva per la prima volta nella storia i pashtun dal governo di Kabul a vantaggio dell'Alleanza del Nord a maggioranza tagika, azara e uzbeca.

Per capire quello che sta succedendo è necessario riportare il ruolo dei talebani nello scacchiere asiatico. Il primo fatto, risaputo, è che il Pakistan ha sempre appoggiato i talebani con una triplice funzione: creare in Afghanistan un regime amico che si opponesse alle rivendicazioni indiane e che formasse una cintura di sicurezza, assieme all'Arabia Saudita, contro le mire espansionistiche e rivoluzionarie dello scita Iran. Mai insomma il governo di Karachi ha visto i fondamentalisti afghani come una minaccia. Ma il Pakistan vive anche grazie all'aiuto americano e le cose non potevano non cambiare dopo l'11 settembre, costringendo il governo ad assumere posizioni più dure. Il fatto è che l'asse centrale dello stato pakistano è rappresentato dal complesso militare con al centro i suoi servizi segreti –l'ISI -, e in questo settore statale invece non c'è stato quel cambio netto di marcia, perché la visione strategica è rimasta la stessa di prima dell'attentato alle Twin Towers. L'India è sempre percepita come il primo nemico. Nel frattempo però, in un gioco di specchi difficile da controllare, il movimento talebano si radicalizzava anche tra i pashtun pakistani che coglievano l'occasione della presenza delle truppe americane in Afghanistan anche per combattere il governo pakistano visto come filo occidentale, nemico del loro popolo e infedele! Come si capisce spinte etnico-nazionaliste, questioni di potere e motivi religiosi si fondono trasformando la questione in un groviglio inestricabile.

Stretto comunque dalla necessità di fare qualcosa, con i talebani pakistani sempre più invadenti, gli americani che minacciano sempre di chiudere i cordoni della borsa, l'esercito pakistano a più riprese ha condotto azioni contro i talebani nell'area tribale. Le ha condotte però male, con scarso impegno e in modo tradizionale. Innanzi tutto, esse non rientrano in una strategia di lunga durata, ma sono campagne isolate e scollegate l'una dall'altra alternando la politica del bastone e della carota, forza e trattativa, in modo sconclusionato (si ricorderà infatti il riconoscimento della legge islamica in deroga al diritto pakistano per quest'area); in secondo luogo sono condotte con una logica non di anti insorgenza ma secondo i principi classici della guerra tradizionale e quindi, in terzo luogo, non hanno al centro la sicurezza della popolazione locale. Il risultato è devastante: un milione e mezzo di profughi per cui non è stato prevista nessuna politica di accoglienza, terreno fertile per ogni propaganda estremista e di reclutamento talebano.

"Afpak "a questo punto non è più un acronimo giornalistico: è una realtà unitaria resa ancor più complessa da altre due fatti come la presenza di cinquanta testate nucleari puntate contro l'unica democrazia dell'area, quell'India che sta facendo passi da gigante nel processo d'integrazione mondiale.

La guerra si sta rilevando come il più impietoso banco della verità di ogni velleità e retorica multilateralista tanto sbandierata in campagna elettorale. A Obama non rimane altro che decidere e agli europei, ancora una volta, non rimane altro che aspettare le decisioni dell'amico americano. E l'Alleanza Atlantica? Il fallimento del ruolo della Nato post guerra fredda come forza di proiezione è evidente e niente dopo questa guerra sarà come prima.

The Iranian Popular Resistance Movement “Jondollah” “To Our Baluchi People and to the General Public of Iranian People”

Released: October 18, 2009

"The Popular Resistance Movement 'Jondollah' declares that one of the heroic men of Baluchistan—land of martyrdom and resistance—named Abdulwahad Mahmadi Sarawani, was able to kill tens of commanders and units from the Iranian Revolutionary Guards, Basij Militia, and officials from the Ministry of Intelligence (al-Ittela'at, literally 'information') by carrying a martyrdom operation in Sarbaz City, one of the cities in Baluchistan Province."

"This martyrdom operation comes as a response to the crimes of the Iranian regime against the Baluchi people; the unarmed and oppressed, who loses everyday a number of its children sacrifices to the crimes of this regime that murdered throughout the last year only hundreds of young men from this province. They were killed between gun shots, hangings or martyred under torture, and Sarbaz City had the biggest share of tens of the best of its innocent people. And from amongst them were the pious Ulama Hafidh Salahadin and Mawlawi Khalilallah Zare'i—who were executed for defending the rights of our oppressed people. Additionally, they executed the brothers Tariq and Asad Wafa'i, and three others from the city, and those are: Thabihalla Naro'i, Hajji Noti Zahi, and Ghulam Rasul Shaho Zahi, and all of those were guilty of Baluchi and Sunni. These crimes left to the Baluchi people no other choice except resistance and responding in the same manner to the Iranian regime."

"And despite outcries and previous warnings that were directed Iranian regime, and demands to stop its crimes and oppression against the Baluchi people, but this injustice hasn't stopped and kept increasing day by day in many shapes and colors, whether racism and discrimination and murder and monstrous executions. Today, this martyrdom operation came in hopes to be pain balm to the wounds of the people of Baluchistan, and many years have passed as it stood bleeding non-stop, and in resistance to stop the crimes of daily executions carried out by the oppressive and tyrannical regime in Tehran."

"Also, this is considered a warning to the Iranian Guards to stop its schemes and refrain from creating collusion and struggle between the tribes and families of Baluchistan."

"The popular resistance movement 'Jondollah' has always sought to avoid violence and bloodshed, and has warned the Iranian Regime continuously, except that this regime, instead of answering to these warnings and good-will, it increased its monstrosity; targeting our innocent people, as every time it fails to face our resistance heroes, it seeks revenge against innocent civilians and the unarmed Baluchi civilians, and this is what we expect it to carry out again after this martyrdom operation, instead of solving the Baluchi case rationally. This operation, for the second time, has shown the determination of the Baluchi people to present sacrifices. It also shows the capabilities of the resistance and the heroism of its men in facing the Iranian Regime, and it also shows the weakness and incompetence of these [Iranian] forces in facing the resistance of the Baluchi people, who are determined to shield against oppression, and to gain its freedom and dearness until the last drop of its blood."

[CIRCOLO DEI LIBERI]

 

Il Circolo dei Liberi

ha il piacere di invitarla

 
 

Mercoledì 21 ore 17,30 presso Accademia la Colombaria, via Sant' Egidio 23 

 "La crisi e il libero mercato: tra liberismo e intervento dello stato" 

 
 

Intervengono 
Francesco Forte, Giovanni Gentile, Maurizio Grassini

Siamo sicuri che questa legge sul testamento biologico sia buona?

Secolo d'Italia 18 ottobre

Siamo sicuri che questa legge sul testamento biologico sia buona, serva cioè a tutelare la vita come nell'intenzione del legislatore?

Capisco l'interesse che la faccenda del testamento biologico suscita. Credo però che sia un'attenzione tutta politica e ideologica, anch'essa simbolo dello stato dei rapporti – della guerra- tra poteri dello stato, scattata questa volta a causa dell'entrata a gamba tesa da parte della magistratura con la sentenza "Englaro". Ma è uno di quei casi di battaglie in cuui piccole e agguerrite avanguardie di opinione fortemente motivate, i fautori delle "decisioni anticipate", riescono a conquistare il palcoscenico della comunicazione grazie ad un'attenzione mediatica a causa della forza dello scandalo. Scandalo che ha portato a rompere il tabù, a decidere da parte della magistratura della vita e della morte di una persona senza rendersi conto della corsa a rotta di collo verso il rafforzamento della prigione in cui rinchiudere i cittadini, dell'aumento dell'invadenza dello stato nelle sfere più intime della persona, senza rendersi conto entrare in una zona dove deve vigere il silenzio, il sussurro, la pietà, non le grida sguaiate e il tifo da stadio. Sono stato direttore della sezione fiorentina della Lega per la Lotta contro i Tumori, consulente per anni di un'associazione impegnata nelle cure di fine vita e di un centro di prevenzione oncolologica e, purtroppo, la mia famiglia è stata duramente compita da questa malattia. L'esperienza, la letteratura scientifica, le storie di vita, mi fanno dire che la paura della morte è la paura di morire in solitudine e soffrendo! E allora il primo compito della collettività è di intervenire nel fine vita, come ha fatto giustamente il governo rendendo le cure palliative un diritto dei cittadini, ma non rompere la sacralità di una barriera.

Ora per riparare al disastro compiuto dai giudici, si chiede che il parlamento legiferi sul fine vita; l'argomento addotto dai sostenitori è forte, se la legge deve entrare in questo ambito, che siano allora gli eletti a decidere al posto di organi irresponsabili, meglio i responsabili davanti ai cittadini che un magistrato qualsiasi. Ma così facendo si passerebbe dall'errore di stato al disastro di stato!

Ogni persona è, prima di tutto, un essere sociale: la sua vita appartiene a sé, alla famiglia, agli amici, alle comunità in cui vive, anche allo stato quando chiede di prender le armi per difendere la patria. La vita di ognuno scorre tra la vita e la morte in un flusso di fatti, eventi e decisioni rispetto a questi momenti fondanti pieno di contraddizioni, incoerenze; decisioni prese, anche nel silenzio della propria coscienza, assieme agli altri familiari, amici, medici, assistenti, per chi crede, sacerdoti e adesso terapeutici vari. Non si vive in un vuoto di significati! Esiste una tradizione, un buon senso a cui rifarsi sempre. E' vero che sono, a quanto pare, messe in discussione e non sono più certe, ma il compito del legislatore è rafforzare questo patrimonio, non affossarlo definitivamente. Chiunque persona ragionevole sia passata per tragedie simili, arriva a sapere cosa deve fare. Quello che vogliono i partigiani del testamento biologico è proprio l'eliminazione della decisione, della responsabilità, anche della colpa ritenuta il male minore.

Rispetto della vita, rispetto delle volontà della persona non sono principi in contraddizione. E'solo un esercizio teorico della filosofia analitica discernere i casi uno ad uno, incrociando tutte le variabili, speculazione che poco ha a che fare con la realtà. La decisione su dove si trovi il limite, sulla valutazione dell'inutilità del dolore rispetto ad una vita degna di essere vissuta, su dove sia insomma la soglia della vita non può essere stabilito per legge. Se una legge ha da essere, mi sembra che ribadire due principi - rispetto della vita, no alla eutanasia, no al dolore inutile e quindi no all'accanimento terapeutico – sarebbe molto meglio che un elenco di tecniche ammesse o proibite.

Se esiste una zona dove né la scienza né lo stato hanno diritto di dire qualcosa, è il passaggio tra la vita e la morte. E' poco credibile l'idea che ci sia una legge che stabilisce cosa sia e cosa non sia "accanimento terapeutico" e quali strumenti possano essere usati e quali no, perché cambia la tecnica, cambiano le condizioni oggettive e soggettive, cambia la mentalità. Il risultato dovrebbe essere una legge che dovrebbe essere rivista ogni poco, con il rischio di affidare queste leggi a volontà politiche del momento.

Ora mi sembra quindi che questa proposta di legge cada in una profonda contraddizione. O non si legifera sulla vita e sulla morte – soluzione ottimale. O si legifera, ma lasciando nel vago della indeterminazione biologico antropologica il passaggio dai due momenti – soluzione di compromesso politico accettabile, vista la nostra splendida magistratura. O si legifera ma si lascia all'individuo decidere a quali cure si vuole sottoporre – soluzione che mi trova assolutamente contrario a cui conduce la logica del testamento biologico. Oppure, ecco la quarta possibilità – quella scelta dal legislatore italiano - la strada peggiore, irta di contraddizioni, che condurrà ad una miriade di ricorsi, perché su questo terreno si scontrano tra loro principi diversi ugualmente forti quali autodeterminazione, dovere della cura, volontà del legislatore;qui, invece, la volontà del cittadino, rispetto ad alcuni atti come l'idratazione, non conterebbe praticamente nulla. Non solo, scegliendo la via giuridica così precisa, si rompe il tabù del rapporto legge positiva-vita: d'ora in poi la definizione di cosa sia una vita dignitosa, la "vita buona", è in mano a maggioranze parlamentari! Bestiale.

Capisco che nel momento, davanti all'invadenza della magistratura, che è andata a inventarsi una presunta precedente volontà della paziente, davanti alla scelta tutta politica del padre di Eluana Englaro dettata dalla decisione, per me incomprensibile, di dare pubblicità e, quindi cercare lo scandalo, alla morte della figlia, si sia scelta la strada del Parlamento secondo il principio, "meglio la volontà dei rappresentanti dei cittadini, che quella dei magistrati".

L'idea di "testamento biologico" appartiene ad una cultura strampalata – post moderna?- che unisce e centrifuga individualismo assoluto di stampo illuministico positivista con una idolatria statalista totalitaria, come se lo stato fosse un ente superiore che può più dell'individuo, perché tutto vede e capisce (idea totalitaria, peregrina e ridicola; in democrazia, stato vuol dire solo affidarsi ai voleri della maggioranza).

La cultura sottostante è il risultato di forze che il processo di secolarizzazione ha liberato dalle catene. Il mito dell'autodeterminazione dell'individuo che crede di poter far tutto e su tutto decidere, la medicalizzazione della vita da parte di una medicina ridotta a tecnica, l'invadenza dello stato che penetra in tutti i pori della vita privata, al di là della volontà del legislatore. E la contraddizione è evidente: tanto più l'individuo si crede libero da vincoli sociali, tanto più si getta in mano di decisori esterni e impersonali: tecnica e Leviatano. L'abolizione, per legge e scienza, della responsabilità individuale.

Un commento sull’Afghanistan

Ragionpolitica 14 ottobre

Torno di nuovo sulla guerra in Afghanistan a costo di essere noioso e ripetitivo, ma mi sembra che in Italia non si riesca a cogliere il nocciolo del problema e si rimanga bloccati ad una impostazione ideologica e moralisticheggiante molto pericolosa, perché non politica e quindi non fornisce ai cittadini gli strumenti teorici, i concetti per afferrare la realtà bellica in quell'area.

Cardine fondamentale affinchè una strategia di contro insorgenza abbia successo è rappresentato dall'esistenza di un governo centrale che riscuota il consenso, per lo meno, della minoranza attiva della popolazione e la neutralità della maggioranza. La legittimità, a sua volta, è conseguenza della capacità delle istituzioni e dell'amministrazione di fornire servizi e sicurezza ai suoi cittadini.

Questa è la sfida che l'amministrazione americana si trova davanti e dove, fino ad oggi, il governo di Karzai ha fallito o per meno ha riscosso poco successo. Al di là della discussione su quale strategia, se quella globale di MCCrystal o azioni di antiterrorismo proposta da Biden, possa funzionare sul campo, il vero nodo da sciogliere è proprio questo. Ha senso mandare altre truppe se poi il governo afghano non esiste? E fino a quando? I talebani sono nostri nemici, ma prima di tutto sono nemici del popolo afghano: gli eserciti NATO sono sul campo per aiutare le forze locali, dalla polizia alle forze armate, ma da soli poco potranno.

Da queste elezioni deve uscire un governo legittimato dal voto popolare in grado di varare le riforme sociali necessarie, un programma di pacificazione nazionale, in primo luogo con i pashtun, e un'azione di lotta contro i trafficanti di oppio e le varie mafie, fonti di reddito infinito per i terroristi di ogni risma. Solo così gli americani e i loro alleati potranno dare un aiuto reale a quel martoriato popolo.

A costo di essere ripetitivi, il rischio di un ulteriore coinvolgimento in Afghanistan è rappresentato proprio dalla debolezza, parzialità e incapacità dello stato centrale, formato da funzionari per lo più corrotti, di funzionare.

A questa obiezioni, i fautori, tra cui chi scrive, della lotta ad oltranza ai talebani devono rispondere.

In caso contrario, in un lungo articolo sul New York Times David Kilcullen, uno dei più ascoltati strateghi ascoltati sia da Petraeus che da MCCrystal, sostiene che "gli Stati Uniti dovrebbero 'afghanizzare' la guerra, ritirare i soldati e prepararsi all'inevitabile disastro che avverrà quando il governo di Kabul,in assenza di una volontà di riforme cadrà, meritatamente e inevitabilmente, nelle mani dei Talebani."

Questa è una guerra politica che si vince non contando i chilometri quadrati di territorio controllato, non il numero dei terroristi uccisi, ma conquistando l'anima e il cervello della gente.
Sempre nello stesso articolo ricordava Merrill McPeak, , capo di stato maggiore dell'aviazione americana
dal 1990 al 1994, "questa è una guerra post moderna, non una tradizionale caratterizzata dallo scontro di forze meccanizzate di stati industriali… In questo tipo di guerre, il nemico ha poco da perdere, nessun territorio da difendere, pochi importanti obiettivi a rischio, forse anche nessuna vita che valga le pena di essere vissuta… Nelle guerre del primo tipo, il successo era rappresentato da un processo misurabile sulla distruzione di importanti beni. Le guerre post moderne sono molto più complicate, essenzialmente inquantificabile è la vittoria".

C'è da notare allora che un incremento del numero dei soldati sul suolo afghano sarà visto da alcune frange della popolazione come un segno ulteriore della volontà degli Sati Uniti di colonizzare il paese. Uno dei metri possibili per giudicare l'andamento della guerra è infatti rappresentato dal numero di attacchi suicidi, schizzati da 9 nel 2005 a 60 nei primi sei mesi di quest'anno.

"Vincere" non significa adesso distruggere fortificazioni, assaltare roccaforti e trincee. Nelle guerre di popolo, la vittoria arriva solo se l'obiettivo è possibile e se riscuote il consenso politico di vari attori, dalle tribù ai clan e ai partiti locali, dalle potenze straniere all'opinione pubblica mondiale.

L'andamento della guerra, come nel caso del Vietnam, è misurato sul supporto che il conflitto riscuote nei paesi occidentali: il nostro centro di gravità non sta in Afghanistan, non è militare o logistico, ma risiede nella tenuta dell'opinione pubblica occidentale.

Bisogna essere estremamente franchi. La guerra dal suo inizio ha cambiato obiettivo. Nata per sconfiggere al Qaida, si è trasformata in un appoggio ad una parte nella guerra civile afghana, a cui la maggioranza dei contingenti NATO partecipa a parole o in modo insufficiente. Il compito che adesso ci troviamo davanti è ben diverso da quello iniziale: se decidiamo di restare, dobbiamo sostenere un impegno ben più gravoso di quanto fatto fino ad adesso.

Notiziario internazionale

L'Occidentale 16 ottobre

Le difficoltà delle nazioni occidentali a trovare una soluzione efficace per le aree di crisi, in modo particolare il Medio Oriente, sono davanti agli occhi di tutti. Stati falliti, paesi sull'orlo della guerra civile sono la regola. E sempre ci si interroga su quali possano essere le soluzioni. Un caso di uscita positiva da queste situazioni difficili ci viene dalla Macedonia a causa della lungimiranza della sua leadership. Quando la ex Jugoslavia si dissolse e cadde in un bagno di sangue, il governo macedone riuscì a sventare di cadere nell'abisso della guerra civile internazionalizzando la crisi e quindi coinvolgendo immediatamente la comunità internazionale in tutte le sue articolazioni: Unione Europea, OCSE, NATO, ONU. Soft e hard power sono stati impiegati in modo intelligente: diplomazia e forza militare utilizzati con pazienza e sapienza e i risultati si vedono. Un paese schiacciato tra Serbia, Albania, Grecia, Kossovo e Bulgaria, formato da un mix di etnie di religione diversa, è riuscito a uscire indenne da ben due crisi, quella appunto successiva alla fine della ex Jugoslavia e ai tentativi secessionisti albanesi fomentati dal Kossovo.

Sempre rimanendo nei Balcani e trattando di un'area calda, eccoci al Kossovo con un'analisi di una situazione dove le due comunità, serba e albanese, sono riuscite a trovare un modus vivendi che può essere l'occasione esemplare per la Serbia per dimostrare tutta la sua buona volontà verso un'uscita definitiva dalla guerra.

Turchia. Il paese è in questi giorni al centro delle discussioni a causa del rifiuto di partecipare ad esercitazioni comuni con americani a causa della presenza con Israele, fino ad ieri unico alleato islamico di Ankara. L'European Policy Center fornisce una sintesi orientativa sul ruolo della Turchia tutta tesa a trovare una sua strada non completamente allineata con l'Occidente con il rischio di cadere però in un fondamentalismo islamico contro cui fino ad oggi sembrava vaccinata.

Cipro. International Crisis Group affronta il problema della crisi cipriota mai veramente chiusa che ha segnato una frattura tra due paesi entrambi alleati nella NATO. Conflitto di vecchia durata che sembrava solo di carattere nazionale. Due ipotesi sono sul tappeto: unità o separazione? Nodo da sciogliere approfittando della data di elezioni dell'aprile 2010 che potrebbe dire un'ultima parola sulla situazione de facto della separazione.

Europa. A proposito di stati falliti, l'Unione Europea nonostante la sua esperienza, sta svolgendo il suo ruolo nel Mondo? "Siamo abituati a bilanciare potere con potere, ma male equipaggiati a confrontarci con stati deboli: nazioni fragili possono richiedere impiego di militari in azioni di peacekeeping e rafforzare stati deboli o gestire il collasso di essi richiede strategie molto più complesse disegnate su capacità civili".

Russia. Sempre dell'European Council on Foreign Relations, una fotografia delle relazioni tra Russia e Europa: se i due paesi vogliono instaurare rapporti saldi e durate voli devono dissipare i dubbi e le reciproche percezioni errate.

La Russia dell'era Putin si è sollevata dalla sua crisi, almeno rispetto al dopo comunismo, graziealle sue risorse energetiche e alla politica ad esse collegata, oltre all'abilità del suo premier. Ecco un report del Congresso americano (purtroppo per la vostra lettura, è messo sul mio blog perché ricevuto per posta elettronica) che analizza i rapporti con i paesi circostanti gestiti in relazione alle forniture di petrolio e di gas naturale.

Iran. Sostenere la via del dialogo con Theran adesso e la screditata leadership è secondo la maggioranza degli analisti un errore madornale. "L'influenza iraniana adesso sui paesi mediorientali sta iniziando a recedere? Mentre l'attivismo del regime degli ayatollah è in pieno svolgimento, vi sono segni inequivocabili che la Repubblica islamica ha raggiunto i limiti del suo appeal".

Afghanistan. In attesa della decisione del tentennante Obama, la situazione diventa sempre più difficile e i fatti riducono i margini di scelta. Il problema è sempre e solo uno, Mc Crystal ha ragione, non è possibile nessun ritiro, nessuna scelta che limiti la guerra ad azioni antiterrorismo; fino ad oggi si è perso tempo, c'è bisogno di una guerra di anti insorgenza, di più truppe sul terreno, garantire la sicurezza alla popolazione,rafforzare l'esercito e la polizia locali, ma c'è bisogno di un governo legittimo, forte e imparziale. Ultima condizione che palesemente manca. Ecco un analisi da un osservatorio non usuale, l'istituto finlandese di politica estera. " Una complessa insorgenza si è diffusa attraverso il paese appena gruppi differenti si sono raggruppati sotto l'ombrello dei talebani e hanno iniziato ad attaccare le truppe internazionali e il governo afghano".

Russian Energy Policy Toward NeighboringCountries

CRS Report for Congress

Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress

Steven Woehrel

Specialist in European Affairs

September 2, 2009

Congressional Research Service

7-5700

www.crs.gov

RL34261

Russian Energy Policy Toward Neighboring Countries

Congressional Research Service

Summary

Russian oil and natural gas industries have become key players in the global energy market,

particularly in Europe and Eurasia. Another trend has been the concentration of these industries in

the hands of the Russian government. This latter phenomenon has been accompanied by an

authoritarian political system, in which former intelligence officers play key roles.

Russian firms have tried to purchase a controlling stake in pipelines, ports, storage facilities, and

other key energy assets of the countries of central and eastern Europe. They need these assets to

transport energy supplies to lucrative western European markets, as well as to secure greater

control over the domestic markets of the countries of the region. In several cases where assets

were sold to non-Russian firms, Russian firms cut off energy supplies to the facilities. Russia has

also tried to build new pipelines to circumvent infrastructure that it does not control. Another

objective Russia has pursued has been to eliminate the energy subsidies former Soviet republics

have received since the fall of the Soviet Union, including by raising the price these countries pay

for natural gas to world market prices.

It is not completely clear whether the pursuit of Russian foreign policy objectives is the primary

explanation for the actions of its energy firms. Few would disagree in principle that the

elimination of subsidies to post-Soviet countries is a sound business decision, even if questions

have been raised about the timing of such moves. Even the pursuit of multiple pipelines can be

portrayed as a business decision. On the other hand, many countries of the region are concerned

that Russia may use their energy dependency to interfere in their domestic affairs or to force them

to make foreign policy concessions. Countries of the region also fear that by controlling energy

infrastructure in their countries, Russian energy firms are able to manipulate the internal political

situation by favoring certain local businessmen and politicians. However, the current global

economic crisis has hurt Russia's energy firms and Russia's international clout, as energy prices

have tumbled.

Bush Administration officials repeatedly criticized what they viewed as Russian efforts to use its

energy supplies as a political weapon. The Obama Administration, like its predecessor, has urged

European countries to reduce their dependence on Russian energy, but has said the United States

is trying to cooperate with Moscow on the issue. The United States has strongly advocated the

building of multiple pipelines from Central Asia and Azerbaijan to Europe. Members of Congress

have expressed concern about the impact on European countries of their dependence on Russian

energy. In the 111th Congress, committees have held hearings that have touched on the issue.

Congress has also passed resolutions that refer to worrisome aspects of Russian energy policy.

Russian Energy Policy Toward Neighboring Countries

Congressional Research Service

Contents

Introduction ...............................................................................................................................1

Russia's Oil and Gas Industries and Russian Foreign Policy ........................................................1

Gazprom..............................................................................................................................2

Russian Oil Companies .........................................................................................................3

Russia's Objectives: Exploiting Dependency or Just Good Business? ....................................4

Selected Recent Cases.................................................................................................................6

Ukraine................................................................................................................................7

Moldova .............................................................................................................................10

Georgia ............................................................................................................................... 11

Baltic States ........................................................................................................................12

Belarus ...............................................................................................................................13

Armenia.............................................................................................................................14

U.S. Policy...............................................................................................................................14

U.S. "Pipeline Diplomacy"..................................................................................................15

Obstacles to U.S.-Supported Pipelines...........................................................................17

Other Policy Issues .............................................................................................................19

Congressional Response......................................................................................................20

Figures

Figure 1. Pipeline Map..............................................................................................................22

Contacts

Author Contact Information ......................................................................................................22

Russian Energy Policy Toward Neighboring Countries

Congressional Research Service 1

Introduction

In recent years, Members of Congress, Bush and Obama Administration officials, and analysts

have noted the dependence of many European countries on Russian energy. Some experts have

expressed concern that Russia is using this energy dependence as part of a larger effort to limit

the sovereignty and pro-Western orientation of vulnerable neighboring countries such as Ukraine,

Moldova, and Georgia. In addition to bolstering the sovereignty of these countries, the United

States has also had a vital interest in keeping strong ties with NATO and EU member states. Some

observers believe that these relations could be harmed in the long term if many of these states

became too dependent on Russian energy.

In 2004, the European Union depended on Russia for 29% of its natural gas consumption and

26% of its oil.1 However, this figure conceals the fact that this dependence is unequally

distributed. Some EU countries, many of them in central and eastern Europe, are dependent on

Russia for most or all of the oil and natural gas they consume. For example, the Baltic states are

entirely dependent on Russia for natural gas. Non-EU countries bordering Russia are also

overwhelmingly or entirely dependent on Russian oil and natural gas.2 Moreover, EU countries

are likely to become more dependent on natural gas supplied by Russia in the future, as deposits

in the North Sea decline. In 2008, 40% of the EU's natural gas imports came from Russia and

33% of its oil imports.3

This report begins with a brief discussion of the Russian oil and gas industries, including their

efforts to purchase energy infrastructure in central and eastern Europe and reduce energy

subsidies to neighboring countries. A second section deals with the impact of Russian energy

policy on neighboring countries, all of them formerly part of the Soviet Union, de facto or de

jure, and all heavily dependent on Russian energy imports. Many of these countries are concerned

about what they see as Russian efforts to manipulate that dependency to achieve political goals. A

final section deals with U.S. efforts to promote the energy security of these countries and on

Congress's response to the issue.4

Russia's Oil and Gas Industries and Russian

Foreign Policy

Russian oil and natural gas industries are increasingly important players in the global energy

market, particularly in Europe and Eurasia. Russia has by far the largest natural gas reserves in

the world, possessing over 30% of the world's total. It is the second-largest oil producer and is

eighth in the world in reserves, with at least 10% of the global total. Another key trend has been

the concentration of these industries in the hands of the Russian government in the past decade.

1 "EU Energy Policy Data," European Commission Document SEC(2007)12, January 10, 2007.

2 U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration, Country Brief: Russia, April 2007, from the EIA

website http://www.eia.doe.gov.

3 EU Energy Portal website http://ec.europa.eu/energy.

4 This report focuses on Russian oil and natural gas industries, due to their central importance to the countries

concerned. Other energy issues, such as Russia's nuclear power industry, as well as electricity and coal exports, are not

dealt with in this report.

Russian Energy Policy Toward Neighboring Countries

Congressional Research Service 2

This latter phenomenon has been accompanied by an authoritarian political system under the tight

control of President Vladimir Putin, a former officer of the Soviet KGB intelligence service. Both

the leadership of state-controlled Russian oil and gas firms and the Russian government are

dominated by former members of the Russian intelligence service, now called the Federal

Security Service (FSB), or are personally close to Putin, or both.

In late 2007, Putin designated First Deputy Prime Minister Dmitri Medvedev (whose functions

included overseeing Gazprom) as his successor. Medvedev was elected president of Russia in

March 2008, in a vote viewed by many observers as not free and fair. Medvedev, although a close

Putin associate, is not a former FSB officer. After Medvedev took office, Putin took the post of

Prime Minister.

The personal and political fortunes of Russia's leaders are tied to the energy firms, as Russia's

economic revival in the past decade has been due in large part to the massive revenues generated

by energy exports. However, many experts believe that the Russian leadership's state-oriented

approach may be counterproductive for Russia in the long run, as output growth in Russian oil

and gas fields is stagnating. They say Russia's oil and gas industries will likely need foreign

investment and expertise, more efficient management, as well as less government regulation and

taxation. The current global economic crisis has hurt Russia's energy firms, Russia's economy,

and Russia's international clout, as energy prices have tumbled.

Gazprom

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the largest firm in Russia has been the statecontrolled

natural gas monopoly Gazprom. (The Russian government holds just over 50% of its

shares.) It has a monopoly on gas pipelines in Russia. It controls nearly 90% of Russian gas

production and over a quarter of the world's reserves of natural gas. Its impact within Russia is

even more significant. It is the single largest contributor to the Russian government's budget,

providing about 25% of tax receipts. It also controls banks, industrial holdings, farms, and media

outlets.

Gazprom has been useful domestically to Russian leaders. It provides most of its production at a

loss (at prices much lower than those in Europe) to Russian companies and consumers, who often

cannot or will not pay, thereby helping to ease social pressures. In exchange for subsidizing

Russian domestic consumers, Gazprom receives a virtual monopoly on exports to richer

customers abroad. Two-thirds of Gazprom's revenue comes from European customers. Many

experts say Gazprom needs to substantially increase domestic prices for gas if it is ever to become

a viable business. Russia has agreed to gradually increase some domestic gas prices to bring them

closer to world market levels by 2011. The move was taken in response to EU criticisms of the

price subsidy in negotiations over Russia's entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO).5

Gazprom's key current gas fields are in decline, its infrastructure is aging, and substantial

investment will be needed just to maintain current, nearly stagnant production levels. Most

foreign observers believe Gazprom could use foreign investment to provide expertise and capital.

In late 2005 Russia abolished the "ring fence" that barred foreigners from owning Gazprom

5 EIA Country Brief: Russia, April 2007, from the EIA website http://www.eia.doe.gov.

Russian Energy Policy Toward Neighboring Countries

Congressional Research Service 3

shares. Foreign ownership of Gazprom shares is modest; the largest foreign investor is the

German firm E.ON, with a 6% stake.6

However, Gazprom's actions in other areas appear to point toward more state control and not

toward more foreign investment. For example, in 2006, Gazprom bought out half of the interest

of Shell and other foreign companies in the Sakhalin-2 gas field project at a very low price after

the Russian government found alleged environmental problems in Shell's management of the

project. In June 2007, the Russian-British TNK-BP oil firm was forced to sell its Kovytka gas

field in Siberia cheaply to Gazprom, after Gazprom refused to approve an export route for the

gas.

Russian Oil Companies

In the 1990s, the Russian government did not have a large stake in Russian oil production. The

major oil companies were controlled by politically well-connected businessmen, dubbed

oligarchs. This policy changed in 2003, when Mikhail Khodorkovsky, head of the giant Yukos oil

firm, was arrested on tax evasion and other charges. However, most observers believe that the real

reason for the arrest was that President Putin believed Khodorkovsky was showing unacceptable

signs of political independence from the Kremlin. Yukos was hit with government claims for back

taxes and declared bankrupt. In 2004, its key oil field assets were bought very cheaply by the

Russian state-owned oil firm Rosneft. The Yukos affair is not the only example of this trend. In

2005, Gazprom bought another major oil company, Sibneft, from oligarch Roman Abramovich, at

a cut-rate price. The firm is now called Gazprom Neft. After the move, the Russian government

controlled over 30% of Russia's oil production.7

In 2006, Putin said that the state would not take control of additional Russian oil companies.

However, the strengthening of state control over the industry may be conducted by other means.

The Russian government has placed pressure on foreign oil companies to sell their stakes in

lucrative Russian oil fields to Russian state firms. The non-state oil firms that remain, such as

Lukoil, are careful to retain close connections to Russian political leaders, in order to retain

control of their businesses. Despite increasing direct and indirect state control, Russian oil firms

continue to seek ties to foreign oil companies, provided that they are satisfied with a minority

ownership stake.

In addition to increasing control over oil production, the government controls Russia's oil and

refined product pipelines, through the state firm Transneft. This monopoly gives the Russian

government leverage against Russian private firms, foreign investors and foreign countries, if

needed. For example, Transneft is the largest shareholder in the Caspian Pipeline Consortium

(CPC). The CPC pipeline carries oil from Kazakhstan to the Russian port of Novorossiysk on the

Black Sea. This gives Russia a near monopoly on the transport of Kazakh oil destined for western

markets. Other members include ExxonMobil and Chevron, which are involved in the

exploitation of the Kazakh oil fields. In addition, Moscow has presented the Western oil

companies with repeated financial demands, and threatened them with legal proceedings for

allegedly unpaid taxes to Russia if they do not comply.8

6 "France Wants Stake in Russia Gas Giant," Reuters news agency, October 10, 2007.

7 "Peter Finn, "Russian Giant Expands Control of Oil," Washington Post, September 29, 2005, D06.

8 For background on Russia's oil and natural gas industries, see CRS Report RL33212, Russian Oil and Gas

(continued...)

Russian Energy Policy Toward Neighboring Countries

Congressional Research Service 4

Russia's Objectives: Exploiting Dependency or Just Good

Business?

Through its energy firms, Moscow has pursued several objectives. Russia has tried to purchase a

controlling stake in pipelines, ports, storage facilities, and other key energy assets of the countries

of central and eastern Europe. Russia needs these assets to transport energy supplies to Western

European markets, as well as to secure greater control over the domestic markets of the countries

of the region. In several cases where energy infrastructure was sold to non-Russian firms, Russia

cut off energy supplies to the facilities.

Russian firms have attempted to buy energy infrastructure in western European countries,

provoking unease in the EU. The EU has pressed Russia to open up its pipelines to western firms

and to provide stronger protections for foreign investment in Russia's energy sector. Russia flatly

rejected EU demands that it ratify the 1994 Energy Charter Treaty, which enshrines these

principles. EU efforts to include the key components of the Energy Charter into a new Russia-EU

Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) have also been stymied. The EU Commission has

proposed an EU energy policy that would prohibit energy-producing companies from owning

distribution networks. It would also bar foreign companies from investing in EU distribution

networks, unless that country permitted such investment in its own networks. Russia strongly

criticized the Commission proposal.

EU countries have also been concerned about Russian actions to coordinate export policy with

other natural gas-producing countries such as Algeria, evoking the specter of a cartel, or "gas

OPEC." Russia has also hinted that the bulk of Russian energy exports could be provided to Asia

or even the United States instead of Europe in the future, once new pipelines to Asia are

completed and new liquefied natural gas facilities are built. However, it is unclear whether the EU

can adopt an effective common policy on the Russian energy question. Central and eastern

European countries within the EU want the EU to take a stronger stance against dependence on

Russia for energy.

On the other hand, energy companies and other influential voices in countries such as Germany

and Italy have forged close links with Moscow in order to secure access to Russian energy

supplies and opportunities to invest in Russian energy projects. They assert that a mutual

dependence exists between Russia and consuming countries. They note that roughly two-thirds of

Russia's export revenues and half of its state budget comes from oil and gas exports. They insist

that the current system of gas pipelines and long-term gas supply contracts gives Russia little

choice but to sell its gas exports to Europe.9 Many European countries are less dependent on oil

supplies from Russia, as they can draw on a more flexible global oil market, with the oil delivered

from tankers.

Facing difficulties in securing control of energy infrastructure in central and eastern Europe,

Russia has tried to bypass countries in the region entirely where possible. It is expanding the use

of the Baltic Pipeline system and its oil terminal at the port of Primorsk and reducing the use of

(...continued)

Challenges, by Robert Pirog.

9 For background on EU energy policy, see CRS Report RL33636, The European Union's Energy Security Challenges,

by Paul Belkin.

Russian Energy Policy Toward Neighboring Countries

Congressional Research Service 5

oil terminals in the Baltic states, such as Butinge in Lithuania and Ventspils in Latvia. In addition,

Russia is considering oil pipeline projects involving Murmansk and other ports in northern

Russia.

Russia's plans for natural gas pipelines have attracted the most attention. Gazprom has started

work on the North European Gas Pipeline (NEGP), also known as Nord Stream, which would

transport natural gas from Russia to Germany via a pipeline under the Baltic Sea starting as early

as 2012, bypassing the states of central and eastern Europe. It would have a capacity of 55 billion

cubic meters per year. In November 2007, Gazprom and the Italian firm ENI signed an agreement

to build a "South Stream" gas pipeline that would run from Russia under the Black Sea through

the Balkans, with branches to Austria and Italy. Bulgaria, Serbia, and Hungary have also signed

on to the project. Gazprom hopes to complete South Stream in 2015. South Stream would also

bypass Belarus, Ukraine, Poland, and other central European countries. In May 2009, ENI and

Gazprom agreed to expand South Stream's capacity to 63 bcm per year.

Another possible natural gas pipeline project is Yamal-Europe 2. This long-proposed pipeline,

which would parallel a currently operating one that has a capacity of 33 bcm, would run through

Belarus and Poland, bypassing Ukraine. The pipeline is unlikely to be built, as the Russian

government and Gazprom have rejected Belarusian proposals to reactivate the Yamal-Europe 2

plans. However, if Nord Stream does not come to fruition, it is at least possible the Yamal-Europe

2 plan could be reactivated.

By seeking a range of transit routes through the region, Russia may be trying to reduce the

leverage that transit countries, including those in central and eastern Europe, have in negotiations

with Russian energy firms. Experts note that the capacity of these new routes, if built, would

likely outstrip Russia's capacity to produce oil and gas to fill them, allowing Russia to allocate

scarce production to "favored" transit countries. Russia may also be trying to reduce the

attractiveness of other routes for oil and gas pipelines from Azerbaijan and Central Asia to Europe

and Asia that would bypass Russia.10

Another objective Russia has pursued has been to eliminate the energy subsidies former Soviet

republics have received since the fall of the Soviet Union, including by raising the price these

countries pay for natural gas to world market prices.11 These actions may be seen as paralleling

the reduction of subsidies to Russian domestic consumers. However, Russia has also used the

withdrawal of price subsidies and the unpaid energy debts of countries in the region as leverage to

try to secure key energy infrastructure in those countries.

It is not clear whether the pursuit of Russian foreign policy objectives is always the primary

explanation for the actions of its energy firms. Few would disagree in principle that the

elimination of subsidies to post-Soviet countries is a sound business decision, even if questions

have been raised about the timing of such moves. In support of their actions, Russian leaders

point to the fact that Russian allies such as Armenia and Belarus have also been subject to energy

price hikes. The pursuit of multiple pipelines can also be portrayed as a business decision,

although some analysts disagree about its wisdom. They assert that Russia would do better to

10 Vladimir Socor, "South Stream; Gazprom's New Mega-project," Jamestown Foundation Eurasia Daily Monitor, June

25, 2007.

11 Keith C. Smith, "Russian Energy Pressure Fails to Unite Europe," CSIS Euro-Focus, January 24, 2007.

Russian Energy Policy Toward Neighboring Countries

Congressional Research Service 6

invest in boosting production rather than building pipelines that it may not be able to fill as its

current oil and gas fields decline.

Many countries of central and eastern Europe are concerned that Russia may use their energy

dependency to interfere in their domestic affairs or force them to make foreign policy

concessions. Gazprom's increases in energy prices to Georgia and Ukraine came after elections in

2004 brought to power pro-Western leaders in what were termed respectively the "Rose" and

"Orange" Revolutions, in reference to their campaign symbols. Analysts asserted that Russian

leaders feared so-called "color revolutions" elsewhere in the former Soviet countries that could

reduce Russia's influence, and even perhaps threaten Russia's own authoritarian regime.

Countries of the region also fear that by controlling energy infrastructure in their countries,

Russia is able to manipulate the internal political situation by favoring certain local businessmen

with participation in local business ventures of Gazprom or other Russian energy firms. These

businessmen are in a position to assume a powerful political role themselves or bribe politicians

to do Moscow's bidding.12

Critics of Russian policy say Moscow's motives become even clearer when viewed in the context

of other actions to apply pressure to neighboring states. For example, Moldova's economy was

seriously harmed by a wine import ban Russia imposed, ostensibly for health reasons, from 2005

to 2007. Georgia has been hurt by Russian immigration restrictions and a wine ban. Both

countries have also faced problems with Russian support for breakaway regions on their

territories. Russia's August 2008 military assault on Georgia and its subsequent recognition of the

independence of breakaway regions South Ossetia and Abkhazia sent a powerful signal to

Russia's neighbors about the costs of angering Moscow. NATO and EU member Estonia suffered

from cyberattacks that may have been instigated by Russia, in the wake of a controversy over the

removal of a Soviet-era military statue from Estonia's capital in April 2007. Russia's critics also

point to Russia's "National Security Strategy to 2020," released in May 2009, which states that

"the resource potential of Russia" is one of the factors that has "expanded the possibilities of the

Russian Federation to strengthen its influence on the world arena."13

While Moscow is often charged with using energy policy to pursue foreign policy goals, it may

also at times use foreign policy issues to benefit its energy firms. In January 2008, the Russian

natural gas monopoly Gazprom reached an agreement with Serbia to buy NIS, the Serbian

national oil company, at what some observers believed to be a below-market price. Gazprom may

have been able to achieve this in part due to then-Serbian Prime Minister Vojislav Kostunica's

appreciation for Moscow's opposition to independence for Serbia's Kosovo province.

Selected Recent Cases

The countries discussed in this report have all faced the impact of Russian energy policy. All are

heavily or entirely dependent upon Russia for their natural gas and oil imports. They face

common issues of cost, reliability of supplies, and Russian efforts to control downstream

infrastructure such as pipelines, refineries, and domestic distribution networks. The countries

12 Testimony of Zeyno Baran before a House Foreign Affairs Committee hearing on "Central and Eastern Europe:

Assessing the Transition," June 25, 2007.

13 The text of the National Security Strategy can be found at the website of the Russian National Security Council at

http://www.scrf.gov.ru/documents/99.html

Russian Energy Policy Toward Neighboring Countries

Congressional Research Service 7

differ in their geopolitical orientation. Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia are non-EU, non-NATO

countries that have had a pro-Western orientation that Moscow opposes. The Baltic states are EU

and NATO members, but Russia maintains a strong hold on their energy sectors. On the other

hand, Belarus has been Russia's most loyal supporter in Europe, while Armenia has been a strong

ally of Moscow in the south Caucasus region.

Ukraine

Although it possesses modest oil and natural gas reserves of its own, Ukraine is dependent upon

Russia for most of its oil and natural gas, both from Russia's own oil and natural gas fields and

from Russian-controlled pipelines from Ukraine's suppliers in Central Asia, especially gas from

Turkmenistan. In 2006, half of Ukraine's energy consumption came from natural gas. Sixty-six

percent of Ukraine's domestic natural gas consumption came from Russia. In 2006, Russian oil

imports accounted for 78% of Ukraine's oil consumption. 14 Most Ukrainian homes are heated by

natural gas. Ukraine's steel and other heavy industries, which play a key role in Ukraine's

exports, are highly inefficient users of energy. However, Ukraine's vulnerability to Russian

pressure has been mitigated by the fact that the main oil and natural gas pipelines to central and

western Europe transit its territory. Ukraine's gas pipeline system has a capacity of 120 billion

cubic meters per year. Ukraine owns the sections of the pipelines that run through its territory as

well as large gas storage facilities. Ukraine has received transit fees from Gazprom, paid partly in

gas and partly in cash. According to a 2006 report of the International Energy Agency, 84% of

Russia's natural gas exports and 14% of Russian oil exports pass through Ukraine.15

Energy issues have played a key role in Russian-Ukrainian relations since the breakup of the

Soviet Union in 1991. Russian firms supplied energy to Ukraine at prices far below market rates.

In the early 1990s, these firms cut off supplies to Ukraine at times due to unpaid energy debts.

Energy sales have been conducted by non-transparent intermediary institutions, offering the elites

of both countries opportunities to profit.

Until recently, Ukrainian foreign policy tried to strike a balance between improving ties with the

West, including nominal support for Euro-Atlantic integration, while not offending Moscow.

However, in 2005 Viktor Yushchenko was elected President of Ukraine, overcoming the previous

regime's attempts at electoral fraud, in what was termed the "Orange Revolution." Russian

leaders, who had strongly backed his opponent, Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych, reacted

angrily to Yushchenko's victory. Yushchenko, Ukraine's first clearly pro-Western leader, said

Ukraine would conduct serious reforms so that it could join NATO and the European Union as

soon as it was ready.

Soon after Yushchenko took office, Gazprom started to demand a sharp increase in the price of

natural gas that it supplied to Ukraine. By the end of 2005, Gazprom demanded a price increase

for its natural gas from $50 per thousand cubic meters (tcm) to $230 per tcm, the current market

price. When Ukraine rejected this proposal, Russia cut off natural gas supplies to Ukraine on

December 31, 2006. Ukraine then diverted to its own use some of the gas that Gazprom intended

for European customers. After western European governments protested sharply, Gazprom

14 U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration, Country Brief: Ukraine, August 2007; and Country

Brief: Russia, May 2008, both from the EIA website http://www.eia.doe.gov.

15 International Energy Agency, Ukraine Energy Policy Review 2006; from the IEA website at

http://www.iea.org/textbase/nppdf/free/2006/ukraine2006.pdf

Russian Energy Policy Toward Neighboring Countries

Congressional Research Service 8

resumed gas deliveries on January 2. Two days later, the Russian government and Gazprom

reached an agreement with Ukraine for ensuring gas supplies to Ukraine. The agreement called

for gas to be purchased by Ukraine through an intermediary firm, RosUkrEnergo. This firm paid

for gas from Central Asia at a price lower than market levels, and adds gas from Russia at market

prices, and provided it to Ukraine at an average price of $95 per tcm. The agreement also

provided for higher transit fee payments to Ukraine (now entirely in cash rather than partly in

gas).

Perhaps more troubling for Ukraine, the accord called for the creation of UkrGazEnergo, a joint

venture between RosUkrEnergo and the Ukrainian state-controlled gas firm Naftogaz that grants

the former access to one-half of Ukraine's domestic market. Ukraine's intelligence service

reportedly believes the owners of RosUkrEnergo are using their control over energy supplies to

secure ownership of energy intensive industries such as fertilizer plants and a titanium plant.16

Some analysts are concerned about possible involvement of organized crime groups in

RosUkrEnergo, as well as corrupt links with Russian and Ukrainian officials. The U.S. Justice

Department reportedly investigated the firm.17 Nominally, Gazprom owns 50% of RosUkrEnergo,

Ukrainian businessman Dimitry Firtash owns 45%, and another Ukrainian businessman owns 5%.

In 2005, Ukranian Prime Minister Yuliya Tymoshenko, who was an important player in the

natural gas industry in the 1990s, called for the elimination of RosUkrEnergo as a middleman.

She was dismissed by Yushchenko in September 2005, in a move that some observers believed

was aimed in part at appeasing Gazprom and its supporters within the Ukrainian government.

Yanukovych's party won Ukraine's March 2006 parliamentary elections, and Yanukovych once

again become Prime Minister. Gazprom's discussions with the Yanukovych government in late

2006 went more smoothly than those of the previous year. In 2007, Russia and Ukraine agreed on

a moderate increase in the natural gas price. The two sides agreed to gradually increase the price

of Russian natural gas to Ukraine over the next five years, until it reaches the world market price.

Some observers have seen Gazprom's tough attitude toward Ukraine in the 2005 negotiations and

its relatively benign stance in 2006 as evidence that Russia has manipulated the gas issue to

undermine Yushchenko. In September 2007, Putin appeared to verify this view when he said that

Russia had no desire to provide cheap energy to "Orange" forces.18

On September 30, 2007, Ukraine held closely contested parliamentary elections. On October 2, as

the vote count showed a narrow victory by "Orange" parties, Gazprom announced that it would

reduce gas supplies to Ukraine, if Ukraine did not pay outstanding debts to Gazprom by the end

of the month. Gazprom officials hinted that Ukraine's energy debts could be solved if it turned

over shares in the gas pipeline system to Gazprom as payment. However, the crisis was resolved

when the Ukrainian government agreed to provide gas in Ukrainian storage facilities as payment.

Gazprom and the outgoing Yanukovych government agreed to a natural gas price of $179.50 per

thousand cubic meters (tcm) for 2008, a 38% increase over 2007, but still well short of world

16 Roman Kupchinsky, "Russia/Ukraine: Pipeline Conflict Resurfaces," Radio-Free Europe Radio Liberty Newsline,

June 28, 2007.

17 Glenn R. Simpson and David Crawford, "Supplier of Russian Gas Draws Investigation," Wall Street Journal, April

21, 2006, 1. For background on the gas crisis, see CRS Report RS22378, Russia's Cutoff of Natural Gas to Ukraine:

Context and Implications, by Jim Nichol, Steven Woehrel, and Bernard A. Gelb.

18 The Times of London, September 15, 2007, 4.

Russian Energy Policy Toward Neighboring Countries

Congressional Research Service 9

market levels. Nevertheless, the percentage increase was double that given to neighboring

Moscow ally Belarus.

In December 2007, Yuliya Tymoshenko was elected by the new Ukrainian parliament as Prime

Minister. She vowed to remove RosUkrEnergo and UkrGazEnergo from Ukraine's gas market. In

January 2008, Prime Minister Tymoshenko took a first step in this direction by sharply reducing

the amount of gas UkrGazEnergo could sell to Ukrainian consumers. The role of middlemen in

the Ukrainian gas market may also be reduced by market forces. RosUkrEnergo's profits are

based on selling cheap Central Asian gas at higher prices to Ukraine. In March 2008, Gazprom

agreed with Central Asian gas supplies to pay "European prices" for their gas in 2009.

Gazprom reduced gas supplies to Ukraine by 50% on March 3-5, 2008, over disagreement on the

price Ukraine should pay for gas delivered in January and February 2008. Ukrainian gas company

officials warned that they might divert gas intended for Western Europe to offset Gazprom's

supply cut. The two sides reached agreement on March 5 and supplies were restored. On March

12, the two sides agreed to eliminate UkrGazEnergo from the domestic gas trade, but gave

Gazprom direct access to the most lucrative part of Ukraine's domestic market—supplies to large

enterprises. The agreement said the fate of RosUkrEnergo would be determined by future

negotiations. However, Tymoshenko appeared dissatisfied with parts of the accord. She remained

determined to eliminate RosUkrEnergo as soon as possible. The Ukrainian government made

significant unilateral changes to the agreement, including barring RosUkrEnergo from the

profitable practice of re-exporting Central Asian gas from Ukraine to other markets.

On January 1, 2009, the state-controlled Russian natural gas firm Gazprom halted gas supplies to

Ukraine after the two sides failed to reach agreement on several issues, including a debt allegedly

owed by Ukraine to Gazprom and the price that Ukraine would pay for gas supplies for 2009. The

cutoff was supposed to affect only supplies for Ukraine; Russia continued to send gas through

Ukraine destined for other European customers. However, within a few days, Russia accused

Ukraine of diverting these supplies for its own use, and by January 6 cut off all deliveries through

Ukraine to the rest of Europe. The European Union sharply criticized the cutoff, calling for a

rapid resumption of supplies, but refused to take sides in what it termed a commercial dispute.

Many large European countries (including Ukraine) did not suffer greatly from the cutoff, despite

frigid temperatures, due in part to substantial amounts of gas in underground storage facilities.

However, some countries, particularly in the Balkans, were hit hard. Negotiations between Russia

and Ukraine repeatedly broke down, with each side accusing the other of bad faith and trying to

enlist European support for its views. Finally, on January 18, Russia and Ukraine reached an

agreement, and gas supplies to Europe resumed on January 20th.

According to the agreement, RosUkrEnergo was eliminated as a middleman in the gas trade. In

the first quarter of 2009, Ukraine was charged $450 per tcm, more than double what it paid in

2008 for gas. However, Ukraine was able to avoid this price increase by using supplies it had in

storage until the gas price declined in the second quarter to $271 per tcm, as the sharp drop in oil

prices was reflected in natural gas prices. The poor financial situation of Naftogaz and its

customers, as well as the devastating impact of the global economic crisis on Ukraine, could lead

to further gas crises, as Gazprom has threatened to cut off supplies again if it is not paid the full

amount it is owed each month. Ukraine has sought loans from the EU, United States and Russia

to pay for gas supplies this year. Gazprom can also fine Naftogaz if it does not buy a minimum

amount of gas. However, Russia has so far declined to impose such fines. The tariffs charged by

Russian Energy Policy Toward Neighboring Countries

Congressional Research Service 10

Ukraine for Russian gas transit to Europe will remain at current below market levels for 2009, but

will be reset to full market rates in 2010.

Russia pursued a long-standing goal of ownership of Ukraine's natural gas pipelines and storage

facilities, as well as its local gas distribution network. In February 2007, Putin announced that he

and Prime Minister Yanukovych had agreed on joint Russian-Ukranian control of Ukraine's

natural gas assets, in exchange for a Ukrainian stake in Russian natural gas fields. However, this

statement provoked a strongly negative reaction in Ukraine, and the parliament quickly approved

a law banning any transfer of control of the pipelines by a vote of 430-0. Russia has tied possible

support for upgrading Ukraine's pipeline network to greater Gazprom ownership of Ukraine's

pipeline system.

In July 2009, the EU Commission brokered an agreement under which the European Bank for

Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and World Bank agreed to provide loans to help

Ukraine modernize its gas pipeline system. Ukraine is required to create greater transparency in

how its gas sector is run. In the short term, $300 million in EBRD loans will be aimed at helping

Ukraine improve its natural gas storage facilities and other infrastructure. In 2010, the EBRD may

loan Ukraine another $450 million for Ukraine to reform its gas sector. The World Bank is

willing to loan Ukraine up to $500 million for structural reforms, including of the gas sector.

In March 2009, Prime Minister Putin sharply criticized the initial announcement of the EUUkraine

gas sector agreement as "ill-considered and unprofessional." Russian officials said that

any agreement about Ukraine's pipelines should include Russia. Russia's anger may be caused by

fears that the EU plan could foil Gazprom's own efforts to secure control of Ukraine's pipelines

and Ukraine's domestic gas distribution network. However, EU participation may help avoid

future gas supply cutoff crises, such as occurred in 2006 and 2009.

Balked in its efforts to control Ukraine's pipelines, Russia is also working on ways to bypass

Ukraine's gas transport system, at least in part. It is developing new energy export routes through

the Baltic Sea (the Nord Stream pipeline) and the Balkans (the South Stream pipeline) to western

Europe by 2012 in the case of Nord Stream and 2015 in the case of South Stream. If successful,

these efforts could reduce Ukraine's leverage over Russia on energy issues. Such a development

could have broader consequences. Russia could feel it would have a freer hand to put greater

pressure on Ukraine on other issues. Key western European countries could feel they have less of

a stake in Ukraine's future, if they, like Russia, were no longer dependent on Ukrainian gas

transport infrastructure.

Moldova

Moldova is the poorest country in Europe, according to the World Bank. It is entirely dependent

upon Russia for its energy resources, and also as a market for the wine and agricultural products

that are its main exports. In 2005, Russia restricted wine and other agricultural imports from

Moldova, allegedly over health concerns, dealing a very heavy blow to the country's economy.

Russia has stalled on implementing pledges to end its embargo on Moldovan wine, still citing

health concerns. In addition, Russia has supported a breakaway regime in the Transnistria region

of the country, including by deploying 1,500 troops there.

In part due to its vulnerable position, Moldova has tried to balance ties between Moscow and

Western countries. However, since 2003, Moldovan leaders, despairing of striking a deal with

Moscow over the Transnistria problem, have sought greater engagement with the West, irritating

Russian Energy Policy Toward Neighboring Countries

Congressional Research Service 11

Russia. Perhaps even more irksome to Moscow, in 2005, Moldova, with EU help, began to

tighten its customs policies to stop profitable smuggling operations from Transnistrian territory.

Powerful groups in Ukraine and Russia have profited from the Transnistria regime's activities.

Russia provides subsidies to Transnistria, which include grants and loans as well as subsidized

energy. In return, Russian firms have received stakes in Transnistrian businesses.19

Russia has pressured Moldova on the issue of energy supplies. On January 1, 2006, the Russian

government-controlled firm Gazprom cut off natural gas supplies to Moldova, after Moldova

rejected Gazprom's demand for a doubling of the price Moldova pays for natural gas. Gazprom

restored supplies on January 17, in exchange for a price increase from $60 per 1,000 cubic meters

to $110. Moldova also agreed to give Gazprom, already the majority shareholder, Transnistria's

13% stake in MoldovaGaz, which controls Moldova's natural gas pipelines and other

infrastructure (Moldova had earlier ceded majority control to Gazprom in exchange for settling

Moldova's gas debts). As a result of the agreement, Gazprom now holds 63.4% of MoldovaGaz's

shares and has control of Moldova's domestic gas infrastructure. It is planned that the price

Moldova will pay for gas will be increased until it reaches the price paid by EU member states in

2011. Moldova paid $318 per 1,000 cubic meters in early 2009. However, the global economic

crisis has since resulted in a drop in the price of Moldova's gas supplies. Gas supplies to Moldova

were cut off during the January 2009 Russia-Ukraine gas crisis, and were restored afterwards.

Georgia

Georgia began to follow a clearly pro-Western orientation after the "Rose Revolution" of

November 2003, which swept out of power political forces with close ties to Russia after they had

tried to use electoral fraud to win legislative elections. Mikhael Saakashvili won presidential

elections in early 2004. Georgia is seeking NATO membership. Georgian-Russian relations

deteriorated in the wake of the Rose Revolution. Russia has many ways to pressure Georgia,

including supporting the breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, and disrupting

economic ties between Georgia and Russia, including in the energy sphere.

In late 2005, Gazprom announced substantial increases in the price of gas shipped to Georgia. In

the winter of 2005-2006, unknown saboteurs bombed gas pipelines in Russia, temporarily cutting

off supplies to Georgia. Gazprom announced in November 2006 that it would cut off gas supplies

to Georgia by the end of the year unless Georgia agreed to a 100% price hike or sold its main gas

pipeline to Gazprom.

However, Georgia's geographical position neighboring energy-rich Azerbaijan has allowed it to

counter Russian pressure more effectively than other countries. Georgia is a transit state for a

pipeline completed in mid-2006 carrying one million barrels per day of Azerbaijani oil to the

Turkish port of Ceyhan (the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan or BTC pipeline). Another pipeline completed

in early 2007 initially carries 2.2 billion cubic meters of Azerbaijani natural gas to Georgia and

Turkey, lessening their dependence on Russia as a supplier. Another pipeline carries oil from

Baku to the Georgian port of Supsa.20

19 International Crisis Group, "Moldova's Uncertain Future," August 17, 2006, from the ICG website

http://www.crisisgroup.org.

20 For more on Georgia, see CRS Report RL33453, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Political Developments and

Implications for U.S. Interests, CRS Report RL30679, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Security Issues and

Implications for U.S. Interests, and CRS Report 97-727, Georgia [Republic]: Recent Developments and U.S. Interests,

(continued...)

Russian Energy Policy Toward Neighboring Countries

Congressional Research Service 12

The August 2008 Russian military assault on Georgia resulted in temporary interruptions of some

oil and gas pipeline shipments, but these were soon resumed. Gazprom also continues to supply

Georgia with natural gas. Nevertheless, the conflict demonstrates Russia's ability to disrupt

pipeline routes through Georgia to European customers, by military means if necessary.

Georgian officials believe that the gas Georgia would receive from participating in the U.S.-

sponsored Nabucco pipeline project, if it is built, would meet all its natural gas needs.

Baltic States

The Baltic states of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia are members of NATO and the EU. They have

often had difficult relations with Moscow. About 90% of their oil comes from Russia, and 100%

of their natural gas. They faced Soviet energy supply cutoffs in the early 1990s, as they were

trying to achieve independence and shortly thereafter. They pay world market prices for their

energy supplies.

In the past few years, the main concern in the Baltic states has been Russian efforts to increase

control over the energy infrastructure in their countries. Gazprom has a large equity stake in

domestic natural gas companies of each of the three Baltic countries.21 When Russian takeover

efforts have failed, Russia has cut off energy supplies to Baltic energy facilities. One striking case

involves the Mazeikiai oil complex in Lithuania. Mazeikiai includes a large refinery, the Butinge

maritime terminal, and a pipeline. It is the largest enterprise in Lithuania (accounting for about

10% of Lithuania's GDP) and provides vitally needed tax revenue. In 1999, the U.S. firm

Williams International bought a large stake in Mazeikiai and also received the operating rights. In

response, the Russian oil firm Lukoil, which supplied the oil to the refinery, slowed deliveries to a

trickle, making Mazeikiai unprofitable. This led Williams, which had financial problems of its

own, to sell its stake to Yukos in 2002.

Under Yukos, the refinery became profitable again. However, when Yukos later fell afoul of

Russian authorities, and was driven into bankruptcy, Yukos attempted to sell its stake in

Mazeikiai. The Polish oil firm PKN Orlen agreed to buy out Yukos, despite an effort by the

Russian government-controlled oil company Rosneft to purchase the refinery. At the end of July

2006, the Russian government-owned oil transport company Transneft announced that the part of

the Druzhba oil pipeline that supplies Mazeikiai was temporarily shutting down for repairs

following an oil leak. Transneft later said that it would not reopen the pipeline, due to its

unprofitability. Transneft has blocked Lithuania's efforts to secure supplies from Kazakhstan

through Transneft's pipelines. Critics charged that once again Russia was manipulating energy

supplies to punish Lithuania for seeking to diversify ownership in its energy sector.22

Another example of a Russian company using its control over energy supplies in an effort to

strong-arm a Baltic country into handing over key infrastructure occurred in January 2003. The

Russian government-controlled Transneft oil pipeline company cut off all oil shipments to the

Latvian oil terminal at the port of Ventspils, after having decreased shipments in late 2002. The

(...continued)

all by Jim Nichol.

21 U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration, Baltic Sea Regional Fact Sheet, July 2006, from the

EIA website http://www.eia.doe.gov.

22 Eurasia Daily Monitor, Volume 3, Issue 161, August 18, 2006.

Russian Energy Policy Toward Neighboring Countries

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move was a large blow to Latvia, as Ventspils has been important to Latvia's economy. Transneft

diverted the oil shipments to its own Baltic Pipeline System and the Russian port of Primorsk,

which it controls. Transneft claims that there is no demand for using Ventspils, a claim viewed

with skepticism by outside observers. Most saw the move as a power play by Transneft to secure

a controlling share of the firm Ventspils Nafta, which operates the oil terminal.23

Estonia has also felt the effects of Russian pressure on its energy supply. On May 2, 2007,

Russia's state railway monopoly halted delivery of oil products and coal to Estonia in the midst of

a political furor over the relocation of a Soviet war memorial statue from a square in central

Tallinn, Estonia's capital.24

Belarus

Belarus, under the authoritarian leadership of President Aleksandr Lukashenko, has been

Moscow's most loyal ally in Europe since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Belarus's unreformed,

largely Soviet-style economy is heavily dependent on cheap Russian natural gas and oil. Gazprom

long supplied Belarus with energy at Russian domestic prices, providing a large indirect subsidy

to the Lukashenko regime.

However, in 2006, it appeared that Russia had decided to reduce its subsidies to Lukashenko. In

late 2006, Gazprom strongly pressured Belarus to sell to it control of the Beltransgaz natural gas

firm (which controls the pipelines and other infrastructure on Belarusian territory) and other key

Belarusian energy firms, or face the quadrupling of the price Belarus would pay for Russian

natural gas. Gazprom threatened a cutoff in supplies on January 1, 2007, if Belarus did not agree

to pay the higher price. Just hours before the deadline, however, the two sides reached an

agreement that averted a gas shutoff. Belarus agreed to pay more than double what it paid in

2006. Belarus's natural gas prices were scheduled to rise steadily, reaching world market levels in

2011. Belarus also agreed to sell Gazprom a majority stake in Beltransgaz. Gazprom is paying for

its share in installments until 2010.

After settling the gas dispute, the two countries were soon embroiled in conflict over oil supplies.

In addition to receiving cheap natural gas, Belarus has also benefitted from inexpensive and dutyfree

crude oil supplies that are processed at Belarusian refineries. Belarus then sold the bulk of

these refined products to EU countries at a hefty profit. In January 2007, Russia moved to sharply

reduce this subsidy to the Belarusian economy. Russia imposed a tariff on oil exports to Belarus.

Belarus retaliated by increasing transit fees for Russian oil supplies to Western Europe. When

Russia refused to pay, Belarus cut off oil supplies to Western European countries, angering their

governments.

Belarus and Russia ended the crisis by agreeing that Belarus would raise its export duty on crude

and refined oil products to Western Europe to match that imposed by Russia. Russia would then

exempt Belarus from most of the new Russian oil export duty. Perhaps most significantly, Belarus

agreed to hand over to Russia 70% of the proceeds that it receives from its exports of refined oil

products to the Western market. This figure was increased to 85% in 2009. The drop in support

from Moscow has caused Lukashenko to cut some government spending and to look to Western

23 Keith C. Smith, "Russian Energy Pressure Fails to Unite Europe," CSIS Euro-Focus, January 24, 2007 from the

CSIS website http://www.csis.org/europe.

24 Russian authorities cited track repairs and a shortage of wagons. RFE/RL, Newsline, May 3, 2007.

Russian Energy Policy Toward Neighboring Countries

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banks for loans.25 Increased capacity at its oil terminal at Primorsk may also lead to Russia

reducing its use of the Druzhba pipeline, which runs through Belarus.

Belarus continues to ask Russia to moderate future energy prices. Belarus paid about $148 per

bcm for gas in the first quarter of 2009, far below that charged to Ukraine. Belarus also wants

Moscow to increase the transport fees it pays to Belarus for use of its pipelines to Europe, so far

without success. To hedge his bets, Lukashenko has called for diversification of Belarus's energy

supplies by imports from such countries as Venezuela, Iran, and Azerbaijan, as well as

development of coal reserves and a nuclear power plant within Belarus. The world economic

crisis has eased Belarus's energy burden somewhat. Gas prices paid by Belarus since the second

quarter of 2009 have dropped due to the fact that market rates for gas are tied to those for crude

oil, which have plummeted in recent months. In June 2009, Prime Minister Putin said that Russia

would continue to provide subsidized oil and gas to Belarus to support its economy.

Armenia

Armenia and Russia have close political and military ties, in large part due to Armenia's desire

for support in its struggle with Azerbaijan over the Nagorno-Karabakh region of Azerbaijan.

However, in early 2006, Russia informed Armenia that it would sharply increase the price it

would have to pay for gas. In May 2006, Armenia agreed to relinquish various energy assets to

Russian firms as partial payment for this price increase. Some critics have alleged that Russia

now has virtual control over Armenia's energy supplies.

In October 2006, Armenian officials announced that Gazprom would assume effective

management control of an Iranian-Armenian gas pipeline. According to some experts, this

acquisition may indicate Russia's intent to block use of Armenia as a pipeline route independent

of Russian control. Some of the gas will be used to generate electricity for Iran and Georgia, but

the remainder may satisfy all Armenia's other consumption needs, removing its dependence on

Russian gas transported via Georgia.26

U.S. Policy

The United States has repeatedly criticized what it has viewed as Russian efforts to use its energy

supplies as a political weapon. During the January 2006 natural gas standoff between Russia and

Ukraine, State Department spokesman Sean McCormack criticized Russia for using "energy for

political purposes." He stressed that while the Administration supported a gradual increase in

prices to market levels, it disagreed with a "precipitous" increase and cutoff. Secretary of State

Condoleezza Rice likewise on January 5 stated that Russia had made "politically motivated

efforts to constrain energy supply to Ukraine."27 In May 2006, Vice President Dick Cheney

25 Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report: Belarus, March 2007.

26 For more on Armenia, see CRS Report RL33453, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Political Developments and

Implications for U.S. Interests, and CRS Report RL30679, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Security Issues and

Implications for U.S. Interests, both by Jim Nichol.

27 The State Department. Statement, January 1, 2006; Daily Press Briefing, January 3, 2006; Secretary Condoleezza

Rice, Remarks at the State Department Correspondents Association's Breakfast, January 5, 2006.

Russian Energy Policy Toward Neighboring Countries

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criticized Russia's tactics of "supply manipulation or attempts to monopolize transportation"

against vulnerable countries in the region as "blackmail" and intimidation."28

In testimony before the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe in June 2007, Bush

Administration officials cast doubt on the reliability of Russian oil and natural gas supplies to

Europe and criticized Moscow's "nationalistic interventions in its energy sector."29 On October

23, 2007, Secretary Rice noted that "we respect Russia's interests, but no interest is served if

Russia uses its great wealth, its oil and gas wealth, as a political weapon, or that if it treats its

independent neighbors as part of some old sphere of influence."30 A State Department spokesman

reiterated U.S. opposition to the use of energy supplies as a political weapon after a March 3-5,

2008, gas supply incident between Gazprom and Ukraine.

The Obama Administration has also expressed concerns about European energy security. On

January 22, 2009, after the resolution of the second major Russia-Ukraine gas crisis, a State

Department spokesman said the conflict "underscores the need for transparent, market-oriented

arrangements for the sale and shipment of natural gas and the importance of diversifying energy

supplies.31 In April 2009, the Obama Administration appointed Richard Morningstar as State

Department Special Envoy for Eurasian Energy.

While the United States has been active on the issue of Eurasian energy supplies, skeptics might

argue that key U.S. interests are not at stake, given the fact that the problem is one of European

dependence, not that of the United States. Moreover, the EU and other European countries will

have to be the main players in finding a solution (if they have the will to do so), with the United

States playing a secondary role.

U.S. "Pipeline Diplomacy"

The United States has urged European countries to reduce their dependence on Russian energy

supplies. The United States has strongly advocated the building of multiple pipelines to supply

energy from Central Asia and Azerbaijan to Europe. These projects include the Baku-Tbilisi-

Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline), which carries 1 million barrels per day of Azerbaijani oil to the Turkish

port of Ceyhan. Another important project supported by the United States has been the South

Caucasus Gas Pipeline (SCGP), which taps Azerbaijan's Shah Deniz gas field.

In the longer term, through about 2020, the United States supports expanding the SCGP. The

United States also supports the Nabucco pipeline, an EU-sponsored project that would supply

natural gas from Central Asia and Azerbaijan to Europe through Georgia, Turkey, Bulgaria,

Romania, Hungary and Austria. An international conference on Nabucco, held in Budapest on

January 26-28, 2009, appeared to enhance the project's prospects. The European Commission

28 "Vice President's Remarks at the Vilnius Conference," May 4, 2006, from the White House website

http://www.whitehouse.gov.

29 Testimony before the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe of Gregory Manuel, Special Advisor to

the Secretary of State and International Energy Coordinator, Matthew Bryza, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of

European Affairs, and Steven Mann, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs,

June 25, 2007.

30 Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, "Opening Remarks at the Office of the Historian's Conference on U.S.-Soviet

Relations in the Era of Détente, 1969-1976," from the State Department website, http://www.state.gov.

31 "Statement on Agreement to Restore Gas Flows to Europe," January 22, 2009, http://useu.usmission.gov

Russian Energy Policy Toward Neighboring Countries

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pledged 250 million Euro, the European Investment Bank 2 billion Euro, and the European Bank

for Reconstruction and Development said it would provide an undetermined amount of financing.

In May 2009, the EU held a summit in Prague with leading transit and supplier nations in

Transcaucasia and Central Asia. The summit agreed to expedite the creation of Nabucco and other

new gas and oil supply routes from the Caspian region to Europe via a "Southern Corridor."

Nabucco received a further boost on July 13, 2009, when Austria, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria,

and Turkey signed an intergovernmental agreement on the project. It is hoped that work on the

pipeline could begin by the end of 2010, with the first gas supplies available by 2014 and full

capacity reached in 2019. Richard Morningstar, U.S. Special Envoy for Eurasian Energy, was an

observer at the Prague summit and hailed the results achieved there.

Another U.S.-backed proposal is a Turkey-Greece-Italy (TGI) gas pipeline. The connection of the

Turkish and Greek gas pipelines was completed in November 2007. The Greek and Italian gas

transport systems are scheduled to be connected by 2012. The pipeline will have a capacity of 8

bcm per year, substantially smaller than Nabucco or South Stream. The Prague Southern Corridor

Summit discussed linking TGI to Nabucco.

Turkey plays a central role in all of these pipeline projects. Turkey limits shipping in the

Bosporus Strait due to environmental concerns. This reduces the potential for tankers to use the

Black Sea to ship oil and gas to European markets. Therefore, supplies from the Caucasus and

Central Asia must cross Turkey's territory or transit across the Black Sea from the Caucasus in the

east to the Balkans in the west. The United States has supported the American Macedonian

Bulgarian Oil pipeline (AMBO), another Bosporus bypass project. It could supply Caspian oil

from the Bulgarian Black Sea port of Burgas through Macedonia to Albania's Adriatic port of

Vlore. It is expected to be completed in 2011.

Turkey appears to be using its prime geographic location as bargaining leverage with both Russia

and the EU, in hopes of making Turkey a regional energy hub. After signing the

intergovernmental agreement on Nabucco in July 2009, Turkey agreed in August to allow Russia

to use Turkey's territorial waters for South Stream. In exchange, Russia will provide support for a

trans-Anatolian oil pipeline crossing Turkey from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean. Russia and

Turkey will also discuss expanding the Blue Stream natural gas pipeline between Russia and

Turkey. In addition, Russia also agreed to build a nuclear power plant in Turkey.

Another proposed gas pipeline is White Stream. It would provide gas from the Caspian through a

pipeline under the Black Sea from Georgia to Crimea, in Ukraine. The pipeline would have to

pass over Russia's Blue Stream pipeline to Turkey on the seabed.32 In April 2009, Georgia and the

White Stream Pipeline Company signed a memorandum of understanding on the project.

However, it is unclear whether the pipeline can find financing in the current economic climate, or

a source of supply.

Bush Administration officials criticized Nord Stream, which would traverse the Baltic Sea floor,

supplying Germany and other western European countries with natural gas, and bypassing the

central and eastern European countries through which the main current pipelines run. The U.S.

has supported discussions by Poland, the Nordic countries, and the Baltic states on alternatives,

including delivering Norway's expanding gas production to northern Europe via Danish pipelines

32 Eurasia Daily Report, October 12, 2007.

Russian Energy Policy Toward Neighboring Countries

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and by developing liquified natural gas terminals in Poland and the Baltic states.33 Bush

Administration officials also criticized South Stream, saying that it will not reduce dependence on

Russian supplies.

Germany supports Nord Stream, as it is looking for a dependable source of natural gas,

particularly after the natural gas and oil crises between Russia and Ukraine and Belarus, which

briefly interrupted supplies in 2006 and 2007. Gazprom owns 51% of Nord Stream, while two

German firms and a Dutch firm own the rest. Former German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder is

chairman of the Nord Stream consortium. On the other hand, the Baltic countries, Poland and

Ukraine have expressed opposition to Nord Stream, fearing that it will give Moscow more

leverage on energy issues with them. Sweden has objected on environmental grounds to the

current path the pipeline would take through its own waters, forcing the consortium to submit to it

another proposed route for approval. The pipeline would also run through the economic zones of

Finland and Denmark.

The Obama Administration has been less critical of Nord Stream and South Stream than the Bush

Administration. Part of the change in tone may be due to an effort to "reset" ties with Russia that

were frayed during the Bush years. Ambassador Morningstar has denied that the United States

and Russia are involved in a "great game"—that is, a geopolitical struggle—for Central Asian

energy supplies. He has said that the United States should at least try to work with Russia on the

issue. In contrast to statements by Bush Administration officials, Morningstar has said that the

United States does not oppose Nord Stream and South Stream; that the United States does not see

Nabucco as being in competition with South Stream; and that it was possible that Russia could

provide gas for Nabucco.34

The United States has advocated extending an existing oil pipeline that currently runs from the oil

terminal at Odesa in Ukraine to Brody, on the Polish border. This pipeline could then be extended

to Gdansk in northern Poland. At present, however, the Odesa-Brody pipeline runs in the reverse

direction, pumping Russian oil to Odesa. In October 2007, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Lithuania,

Ukraine, and Poland signed an agreement to fund a feasibility study on the Odesa-Brody

extension project.

Obstacles to U.S.-Supported Pipelines

These U.S. efforts at "pipeline diplomacy" face challenges. The success or failure of these

projects will likely depend more on whether private energy firms find them profitable than on

U.S. diplomatic skill and energy. A particular concern is whether there is enough oil and natural

gas to supply the various pipelines. Russian-supported pipelines appear to have the upper hand

because they have supplies available. Their potential profitability makes them tempting even to

central and eastern European countries that are trying to reduce dependence on Russia. In

addition, Moscow can offer them and western European firms participation in exploiting oil and

natural gas fields in Russia.

33 Testimony of Gregory Manuel, Matthew Bryza, and Steven Mann in a hearing before the Commission on Security

and Cooperation in Europe, June 25, 2007.

34 Morningstar's testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing "$150 Oil: Instability, Terrorism,

and Economic Disruption, July 16, 2009; State Department Foreign Press Center Briefing, June 23, 2009.

Russian Energy Policy Toward Neighboring Countries

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For example, the prospects for Nabucco are clouded, as Moscow has proposed alternative

pipelines on similar routes in order to steer European countries away from full support for the

U.S.- and EU-backed projects. Many view South Stream as a direct challenge to Nabucco, and

has the support of Italy, Bulgaria, Serbia, and Hungary. The Austrian state-controlled energy firm

OMV has agreed to sell a 50% stake in its Baumgarten gas storage and distribution center. The

move could allow Moscow to block Nabucco, as Baumgarten is the planned terminus of the

project.35 In March 2009, in what some observers viewed as another possible effort to block

Nabucco, the Russian firm Surgutneftegas acquired from OMV a large stake in the Hungarian

energy giant MOL, a key player in the Nabucco project. The Hungarian government has

supported both Nabucco and South Stream.

It is unclear whether sufficient natural gas supplies exist for U.S.-supported routes. The United

States is strongly opposed to tapping Iran's energy resources, due to Iran's support of terrorism,

its nuclear ambitions, its policy in Iraq, and other factors. Instability in Iraq makes it uncertain

whether supplies can be drawn from there in the near future. The main U.S. hopes lie with Central

Asia and Azerbaijan. However, Moscow retains strong levers of influence over oil-rich

Kazakhstan and key natural gas supplier Turkmenistan, including control over the pipelines

transporting most of their current output. In December 2007, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and

Russia signed an agreement to build a new natural gas pipeline from Central Asia along the

Caspian Sea to Russia, in yet another apparent effort to eclipse U.S.-led alternatives. However,

little progress has been made on the project since the initial agreement.

Russia and Iran have placed another obstacle in the way of U.S.-supported efforts. They have

asserted that no country bordering the Caspian Sea can legally undertake projects such as building

a pipeline on the seabed or drilling for oil and gas there without the consent of all Caspian littoral

states. Although the other littoral states reject the Russo-Iranian view, this position could make

potential investors leery of investing in such a project. Shipments via tanker across the Caspian to

Baku can be increased, but would be more expensive. Long-standing tensions between Azerbaijan

and Turkmenistan over their Caspian Sea border could also hinder U.S. plans.

On the other hand, alternative routes may be tempting to Central Asian states, given the fact that

Moscow has struck a hard bargain with them on the use of Russian pipelines in the past. To head

off this possibility, in 2009 Gazprom began paying Turkmenistan European market prices for its

gas. Previously, Turkmenistan had been forced to sell its gas to Russia for less than half of the

European price.

A dispute erupted between Russia and Turkmenistan over responsibility for an explosion in a gas

pipeline in Turkmenistan in April 2009. Subsequently, Turkmen leaders have said that they are

looking to diversify their supply routes. In a possible signal that Turkmenistan was interested in

selling gas to European customers, Turkmen leaders offered an gas exploration contract to RWE,

a German firm that is a key investor in Nabucco.

Nevertheless, dissatisfaction of Central Asian energy producers with Russia may not necessarily

mean that they will opt for U.S.-supported pipelines to Europe. They are developing pipelines

eastward, toward China and the rest of Asia. A pipeline from Turkmenistan to China will open

later in 2009, delivering 30 bcm of gas per year. China is also helping develop South Yoloten, one

of Turkmenistan's biggest gas fields. Turkmenistan is also working to expand its gas pipeline

35 Eurasia Daily Monitor, November 19, 2007.

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capacity to Iran. Increased transport of Central Asian energy through non-Russian pipelines could

have a significant impact on the energy plans of the United States, the European Union, and

Russia.

Azerbaijan is the most eager advocate in the region of the U.S.-supported pipeline plans, but has

the disadvantage that it has only modest amounts of natural gas to export at present. The United

States hopes that this will change by 2015 or 2016 as Azerbaijan develops its gas fields.36

However, Azerbaijan has shown impatience with delays in the Nabucco project. In March 2009,

Russia and Azerbaijan signed a memorandum of understanding to sell Azerbaijani gas to Russia.

The decision could deal a serious blow to Nabucco, depending on the volumes of gas that are

exported to Russia in the future.

Other Policy Issues

The Europeans, supported by the United States, may be able to take other steps to diversify their

energy supplies. Oil and natural gas pipelines in Europe run in a mainly east-west direction. More

north-south interconnections within Europe could help to buffer any shortfalls in a particular

region. Larger storage facilities could also be helpful in this regard. European leaders have

endorsed European Commission proposals to enhance interconnections within Europe and

increase storage, but the initiatives remain in the planning stage.

In the longer run, liquefied natural gas (LNG) delivered to terminals throughout Europe may be

an economical substitute for natural gas from Gazprom pipelines. Interconnections and LNG

could help create an integrated gas market in Europe, making it easier for countries to diversify

their supplies, rather than rely on long-term contracts signed with Gazprom, which could allow

Russia to play them off against each other for its own political or economic advantage. Already,

LNG (largely from North Africa) makes up 15% of Europe's gas imports, and is particularly

important for some western European countries. For example, 65% of Spain's gas imports are

LNG.37 Poland intends to build an LNG terminal on the Baltic Sea in order to diversity its

supplies. For its part, Russia also has its own plans for LNG exports so that it can sell more gas to

Asia and even the United States, and avoid being locked into Europe as its only customer. U.S.

and European officials have stressed the need for countries of the region to improve energy

conservation and develop alternative fuels, although they acknowledge that these efforts will take

time.

In the long run, Russia's statist, manipulative approach to energy policy may eventually be

moderated by its own needs. Some observers believe that Russia will need Western investment

and expertise to fully exploit new oil and natural gas fields as current ones decline over the next

decade. This may provide an opening for the United States and other countries to persuade Russia

to liberalize its energy sector. Russia's control of Central Asian supplies has allowed it to

postpone the massive investments needed to exploit remote areas of its own territory, such as

Eastern Siberia, the Arctic, and the Far East. However, this may change due to increasing

worldwide demand for energy and the diversification of export routes by Central Asian countries.

On the other hand, the current statist system has provided Russia's leaders with immense personal

wealth and power, and afforded them the satisfaction of overseeing Russia's renewed

36 Testimony of Gregory Manuel, Matthew Bryza, and Steven Mann in a hearing before the Commission on Security

and Cooperation in Europe, June 25, 2007.

37 See CRS Report RL33636, The European Union's Energy Security Challenges, by Paul Belkin.

Russian Energy Policy Toward Neighboring Countries

Congressional Research Service 20

international strength. They may not want to change this system, even if it might be in Russia's

long-term interest to do so.

In addition to diplomacy, the United States has other tools to deal with the energy dependency

question. The United States has funded feasibility studies for some pipeline routes through the

Trade and Development Administration (TDA). For example, in August 2007, the TDA provided

$1.7 million for feasibility studies on building both an oil and a gas pipeline across the Caspian

Sea to link to the BTC pipeline and the South Caucasus gas pipeline.38 The Export-Import Bank

has also provided funds for pipeline projects. The United States and EU are working with Ukraine

to develop an energy efficiency action plan for that country. The United States provides small

amounts of aid to the countries of the region to help build their energy security.

Congressional Response

Members of Congress have expressed concern about the impact of Russian energy dependency on

the countries of central and eastern Europe. Members have sharply criticized Russian policy and

called on the European Union to work with the United States in helping these countries diversify

their energy supplies. Senator Richard Lugar has called for a greater NATO role in energy

security issues, including providing emergency energy assistance to member states facing a

sudden energy cutoff.39 Bush Administration officials said NATO could play a greater role in the

security of pipelines and other energy infrastructure, but that broader energy issues are best dealt

with in other venues.

In the 111th Congress, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee has held hearings on policy

toward Russia in March 2009 and energy security in May 2009. In both hearings, Senator John

Kerry, Chairman of the committee, Senator Lugar, and witnesses before the committee expressed

concern about Russia's use of energy supplies for political purposes. In July 2009, the Senate

Foreign Relations Committee held a hearing on energy security during which Senator Kerry and

Senator Lugar hailed the signing of the intergovernmental agreement on Nabucco, at which

Senator Lugar was present. Nabucco was also discussed at an August 2009 Senate Foreign

Relations hearing on Georgia. In February 2009, in a hearing of the House Foreign Affairs

Committee on U.S.-Russian relations, Chairman Howard Berman and several witnesses criticized

Russia's political use of energy in Europe. In hearings of the Europe Subcommittee of the House

Foreign Affairs Committee in June and July 2009, Members expressed concerns about Russia's

energy policy in Europe with Philip Gordon, Assistant Secretary of State for Europe and Eurasia,

who repeated Administration calls for European energy diversification.

Congress has also passed resolutions that refer to concerns about Russian energy policy. S.Res.

530, in a list of criticisms of Russian policies on the eve of the St. Petersburg G-8 summit in July

2006, expressed disapproval of Russian energy policy toward Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova, and

other countries. H.Res. 500, passed in July 2007, charged that Russia and other countries in

creating a gas OPEC, and criticized Russia's use of its gas supplies as a political tool against

Georgia, Ukraine, Belarus, and other countries. In July 2008, the Senate passed S.Res. 612,

which called on the United States and other countries to build a constructive relationship with

38 "Promoting Technology in the Oil and Gas Sector," TDA website, http://www.ustda.gov.

39 "Remarks to the German Marshall Fund Conference," Congressional Record, December 7, 2006, S11483-S11485.

For a discussion of NATO's role in Western energy security, see CRS Report RS22409, NATO and Energy Security, by

Paul Gallis, updated regularly.

Russian Energy Policy Toward Neighboring Countries

Congressional Research Service 21

Moscow at the 2008 G-8 summit, but criticized some Russian policies. It said that "the conduct of

Russian trade and energy policy has created a widespread perception that the Government of the

Russian Federation is using oil and gas exports and economic policy as a means of political

pressure on countries that seek closer ties with the United States and Euro-Atlantic partners."

In the 111th Congress, Representative Ros-Lehtinen introduced H.Con.Res. 61, which calls on

Russia's G8 membership to be conditioned on its compliance with its international obligations

and commitment to democratic standards. The resolution says that the Russian government has

apparently used its energy resources as a political tool against neighboring states, harassed

domestic and foreign energy companies to gain control over these industries; and tried to gain

control over energy infrastructure in Europe in order to dominate European energy markets.

Russian Energy Policy Toward Neighboring Countries

Congressional Research Service 22

Figure 1. Pipeline Map

Source: U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration.

Country Brief: Russia, April 2007, form the EIA website http://www.eia.doe.gov

Author Contact Information

Steven Woehrel

Specialist in European Affairs

swoehrel@crs.loc.gov, 7-2291